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THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE COMMON LAW, BRANZBURG v. HAYES, 




Reporters1 believe strongly that confidential sources are essential to 
successful investigative reporting.2 Without them, it is argued, the tradi-
tional ''undisclosed informant" would not exist, drying up many rich 
sources of information for the media. 3 This point was forcefully made by 
the reporters in perhaps the most famous investigation of all time. 
To the President's other men and women-in the White House and 
elsewhere-who took risks to provide us with confidential informa-
tion. Without them there would have been no Watergate story told 
by the Washingto~ Post.4 
The reporter's belief in the need for the protected, confidential source 
has strong roots in our history5 and has been incorporated in the American 
Newspaper Guild's Code of Ethics: ''Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal 
confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or 
Copyright ©1984 Paul Marcus • 
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona, College of Law. A.B., 1968; J.D., 
1971, University of California at Los Angeles. · 
1. The term ''reporters" is used throughout this article to include members of all forms of 
media who are involved in the newsgathering process. The definitional niceties presented by the 
statutory term will be explored infra in the text accompanying notes 363-67. 
2. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 10 MICH. L. REv. 229, 245-46 
(1971). Blasi noted that confidential informants aid in several areas: ''not-for-attribution quota-
tions," verification of other sources, and assessment of the information which should be empha-
sized in a story. 
3. Blasi conducted an empirical study of reporters and concluded that many thought that 
dependence on confidential sources was important to the reporters' ability to function effectively. 
/d. at 247. 
4. C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PREsiDENT'S MEN 7 (1974). 
5. Even the Federal Papers were published under the cloak of anonymity. See the discus-
sion in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) and in Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 953 
(Fla. 1976). 
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before judicial or investigative bodies."6 
The reporter's privilege claim is not of recent vintage. What has de-
veloped in the twentieth century is a confrontational battlefield in which 
the claimed privilege often clashes with other interests. This can occur in 
several ways. In a criminal proceeding the accused may subpoena the re-
porter and request notes of interviews with witnesses7 or copies of docu-
mentary evidence. 8 In a civil action the reporter may herself be a party 
and have evidence relevant to the cause of action9 or, as a non-party, she 
may have information which will assist the parties in the presentation of 
the case.10 
As we shall see, 11 courts have been loath to allow the claimed privi-
lege to be asserted, especially in civil cases in which the reporter is a party 
or in criminal prosecutions where the evidence could prove dispositive.12 
As stated by one court: "The rights of the press under the First Amend-
ment can never exceed the rights of a defendant to a fair and impartial 
tria1."13 As this quote indicates, two competing interests can often be 
raised in this context. The first is the concern that there be a full and fair 
judicial proceeding at which all relevant evidence is presented. The other 
is that presented in the first amendment. Justice Black made the argument 
well: ''The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of govern-
ment and inform the people."14 
The problem has been particularly vexing in recent years. Reporters 
have been vehement in their opposition to subpoenas and other court or-
ders involving confidential sources. This opposition has manifested itself 
in a willingness to pay fines and even to go to jai1.15 The problem has been 
all the more vexing within the last two decades because courts and legisla-
tures have recognized the need both for full disclosure in many cases16 and 
6. Cited in Co=ent, Newsman's Privilege 1Wo Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: Tire Firs/ 
Amendment in Jeopardy, 49 TuL. L. REv. 417, 418 n.7 (1975). 
7. See. e.g., People v. Iannaccone, 112 Misc. 2d 1057, 447 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1982). 
8. See, e.g., People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 338 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1976) (news photos 
which would allegedly have shown the trajectory of the bullets in a murder case). 
9. For a good discussion of cases in which the media is the subject of libel actions, see Note, 
Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 338 (1981). 
10. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
11. See infra notes 21-46 and accompanying text. 
12. See Co=ent, Reporter's Privilege, 58 DENVER L.J. 681 (1981); Co=ent, .Developments 
in the News Media Privilege, 33 MAINE L. REv. 401 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Co=ent, 
.Developments]. 
13. 158 N.J. Super. 488, 492, 386 A.2d 466, 470 (1978). 
14. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (concurring opinion), 
See also Justice Harlan's statement in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967): "[It 
was) the intent of the Founders .... that a free press would advance 'truth, science, morality and 
arts in general' as well as responsible government." Id. at 147. 
15. Some penalties have been relatively minor, as in In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Li· 
tig., 680 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir.) ($100 per day fine), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982) and United States 
v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir.) ($1 per day fine), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). But 
see In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (40 days in jail, fine of $285,000), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
997 (1978) and United States v. Steelha=er, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976) (reporter initially 
sentenced to six months imprisonment). Questions have been raised over the effectiveness of any 
form of imprisonment or fine in this area. See Murasky, Tire Journalist's Privilege.· Branzburg and 
. Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REv. 829, 863 (1974). 
16. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). "The need to develop all 
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for protection of sources.17 The resolutions we have seen have been 
neither wholly satisfactory nor complete, for the process requires a "deli-
cate balance of interests."18 
It is this writer's view that it is important to recognize a qualified priv-
ilege for reporters in both criminal and civil cases. It is essential that the 
first amendment interests of the press in gathering and disseminating in-
formation be supported through the privilege avenue. On the other hand, 
in cases in which information cannot be obtained from other sources and 
where disclosure is essential to the disposition of the case, the media repre-
sentatives should not be allowed to claim a first amendment shield from 
disclosure. The traditional common law position was a fiat refusal to con-
sider the media argument. We look first to that position, then turn to the 
Supreme Court's puzzling opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 19 and :finally 
consider a proper resolution of the problem. 
THE COMMON LAW APPROACH 
Reporters in the United States "have a long history of protecting the 
confidentiality of their news sources."20 Great figures in our history have 
been involved in this process when directed by courts and legislatures to 
appear and give information. Benjamin Franklin's half-brother was 
brought before a committee of the legislature and told to reveal the name 
of an author of a story in his newspaper. When Franklin refused, he was 
imprisoned for a month.21 Twelve years later, in 1734, John Peter Zenger, 
who had been in jail for libelling the governor, refused to give the sources 
of his information. After remaining in jail for nine months, Zenger was 
tried and acquitted.22 The earliest reported judicial decision is generally 
thought to be Ex parte Nugent23 in 1848. Nugent was a newspaper re-
porter who had obtained secret documents concerning a proposed treaty to 
terminate the war with Mexico. The United States Senate subpoenaed 
him, but he refused to disclose his source. The Senate jailed Nugent after 
holding him in contempt, and his habeas corpus petition was unsuccess-
fu1.24 This long history of defiance by reporters has continued to the pres-
ent time, with numerous cases25 being decided in which reporters have 
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive • • • The very 
integrity of the judicial system ••. depends on full disclosure .••• " I d. at 709. 
17. See infra, text accompanying notes 320-55. 
18. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d .139, 148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 
(1981). 
19. 408 u.s. 665 (1972). 
20. Day, Shield Laws and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 2 CoM. AND THE LAW I, 3 
(1980). 
21. Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARv. J. LEG. 233, 234 (1974). 
22. See M. VAN GERPEN, PRlviLEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS 5-6 (1979). 
23. 18 F. Cas. 471 (no. 10,375) (D.C. Cir. 1848). 
24. See discussion in Comment, The. Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitu-
tional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 10 J. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 299, 301-02 
(1979). 
25. See, e.g., Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 
S.E. 781 (1911), and other cases "cited in Comment, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for Statutory 
Protection of News Sources, 61 KY. LJ. 551, 552-53 (1972). See also Note, Evidentiary Privilege, 6 
U. DAYTON L. REv. 251 (1981). As stated in Saxon, "Cases Against Reporters Increase," New 
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gone to jail rather than reveal sources.26 
While the empirical data in this area is notoriously incomplete,27 it is 
indisputably certain that the problem of reporters refusing to disclose 
sources is not new but is one which the common law had to confront fre-
quently.28 It is just as certain that historically judges did not grant the 
privilege, at least not expressly.29 
Until recently, many judges adopted Professor Wigmore's test for de-
termining whether a privilege should be granted. 
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will 
not be disclosed; 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; 
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered; and 
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of 
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained 
for the correct disposal of litigation. 30 
Accordingly, few judges had difficulty rejecting the media's position. 
In general . . . the mere fact that a communication was made in ex-
press confidence, or in the implied confidence of a confidential rela-
tion, does not create a privilege. . . . No pledge of privacy, nor oath 
of secrecy, can avail against demand for the truth in a court of jus-
tice. . . . Accordingly, a confidential communication . . . to a jour-
nalist ... is not privileged from disclosure.31 
Two chief reasons have been given for the rejection of the reporter's 
privilege at common law. The first, and principal, ground is that any privi-
lege restricts the fiow of evidence at trial and thus should be granted only 
rarely. The Supreme Court of Idaho stated the view succinctly: ''New 
testimonial privileges are disfavored since they obstruct the search for the 
truth."32 In essence, courts traditionally have taken the view that it is the 
York Times, July 25, 1978, at Bl, col. 1: "Contempt-of-court proceedings al?ainst journalists re-
fusing to disclose their sources are a fairly new phenomenon that multiplied m the 1970's despite 
laws adopted in many states to protect a reporter's confidential information." 
26. There have been few instances in which reporters have disclosed in response to a threat of 
fine or imprisonment. See Comment, supra note 6, at 417. 
21. Justice White seized upon this point inBranzburg. See infra text accompanying notes 73-
76. See generally Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg v. Hayes: Wither Now'!, 64 
J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218, 231 (1973). 
28. The claimed privilege is not limited to members of the media. Some academic scholars 
have also refused to disclose sources. See United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cerl. 
denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973). 
29. "There can be little dispute that the common law recognized no privilege which would 
support a newspaper or reporter in refusing, upon proper demand, to disclose information re-
ceived in confidence." Umted States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 214 (D.D.C. 1972). See also 
Comment, supra note 27, at 227. 
30. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in original). See gen-
erally Note, Shielding Editorial Conversations .from .Discovery: The Relationship Between Herbert 
v. Lando and Oregon's Shield Law, 59 OR. L. REv. 477, 481 (1981); Comment, supra note 25, at 
552; Comment, .Developments, supra note 12, at 40. 
31. Wigmore, supra note 30, at § 2286. 
32. Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 291, 562 P.2d 791, 794, cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 930 (1977). See also Wigmore, supra note 28, at § 2192: "It has ... been recognized as a 
fundamental maxim that the public • . . has a right to every man's evidence." 
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responsibility of each person to give evidence in open court33 unless a 
strong policy reason dictates a privilege.34 
The other reason given for rejecting the reporter's privilege is that 
such protection would not necessarily improve the free flow of accurate 
information. 
. . . Superior protection from forced disclosure of news sources may 
also mean merely that journalists are at greater liberty to invent the 
news; a priori, greater immunity from having to validate a story 
plainly can be as much of an incentive for sensationalized fiction as 
for the fearless reporting of actual corruption.35 
Upon analysis, these reasons for rejecting the privilege do not appear 
powerful. While it is no doubt true that we should do all we can to pro-
mote the free flow of evidence in court, we have traditionally excluded 
numerous sources of information because of the policies served by such 
exclusion. The law does not require the priest to discuss a confidential 
communication because, as a matter of policy, it is believed that the need 
for evidence is outweighed by the need to maintain this sort of confidential 
relationship. Hence, it is not enough to say that the law wishes to en-
courage full disclosure at tria1;36 the real question is whether the need for 
evidence outweighs, in all cases, the claimed need for a confidential rela-
tionship. I do not believe that such a showing can always be made. 
As to the second ground, the encouragement of accurate reporting, it 
is difficult to understand how the rejection of a privilege supports more 
responsible reporting. Particularly in criminal cases, one might legiti-
mately ask what incentive there would be generally to invent stories or 
facts in stories.37 If such an incentive exists, the presence or absence of a 
privilege would appear somewhat irrelevant. Moreover, and further to the 
point, there is simply no evidence to support the view that a privilege cre-
ates ·greater liberty to invent stories or portions of stories. No showing has 
even been made that, for instance, reporters fo:r: the Baltimore Sun have 
33. [T]he longstanding principle that ''the public . • . has a right to every man's evi-
dence," except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory 
privilege, is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings. 
These are recent reaffirmations of the historically grounded obligation of every per-
son to appear and give his evidence before the grand jury. ''The personal sacrifice in-
volved is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the 
public." And while the duty may be "onerous" at times, it is ''necessary to the adminis-
tration of justice." 
Uniteli States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973). See also Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 303, 
184 P. 375, 377 (1919) ("A witness may not refuse to testify because such testimony may infiuence 
civil litigation in which he is interested. For the same reason he may not refuse to testify because 
he considers the matter inquired about as his 'private, confidential, and personal business.' "). 
34. Policy forms the basis for such well accepted privileges as the attorney-client privileges 
and doctor-patient communications. 
35. Van Alystne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment on Some New Trends 
and Some Old Theories, 9 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1, 16 (1980). 
36. Of course, many of the cases never involved a trial issue at all and were never likely to. 
In such cases (grand jury investigations, civil discovery) the support for compelled disclosure be-
comes somewhat more problematic. 
37. This is all the more obviously true when one considers that the reporter-with or without 
privilego-may be subject to libel actions. Before the constitutionalization of the tort---.ree New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)-this was a relatively potent weapon for the 
unjustly accused. 
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been more "creative" with the facts than reporters for the Houston Post 
because Maryland has had a statutory reporter's privilege for almost one 
hundred years and Texas has not. In some cases reporters may exaggerate 
or even lie, but surely it would be impossible to demonstrate that they are 
more or less inclined to do so because of the existence or nonexistence of a 
privilege. 
While common law judges have expressly rejected the privilege, they 
would appear to have accepted the criticism of the reasons given for re-
jecting it. That is, while no common law case existed38 in explicit support 
of the privilege, judges were not at all tough in their treatment of journal-
ists who refused to disclose sources. Some judges for "technical reasons" 
refused to compel disclosure; others, while ostensibly ordering disclosure, 
imposed remarkably weak penalties for those who failed to comply.39 We 
are, therefore, left with the anomaly of the common law. Judges expressly 
rejected a reporter's privilege, yet when faced with refusal to divulge infor-
mation, those same judges exercised great leniency. 
In recent times, the problem has been exacerbated. More forms of 
media devote more effort to investigative reporting,40 resulting in the crea-
tion of more confidential relationships between reporters and infor-
mants.41 As a consequence, there has been a good deal of litigation in the 
last two decades in which reporters have been directed to disclose 
sources.42 Not surprisingly, there has also been a parallel, sharp increase 
in the number of states which now provide statutory privileges for report-
ers.43 Unfortunately, the state statutes do not provide a uniform manner 
of treatment of the problem and there is no federal rule which would apply 
on a nationwide basis. Because of the extremely difficult balancing of in-
terests present in cases in which the privilege is raised,44 there was opti-
mism that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. 
Hayes would finally resolve many of the difficulties. The optimists, how-
ever, were greatly disappointed. 
38. There were no common law cases until recently, with the development of the federal 
common law privilege. See infra and notes 179-83 and accompanying text. 
39. See Comment, supra note 27, at 227. 
40. Carley, "Bad Reception: As TV News Reporting Gets More Aggressive It Draws More 
Suits," Wall St. Journal, Jan. 21, 1983, at 1. 
41. Blasi, supra note 2, at 252-53. 
42. See generally Murasky, supra note 15, at 830 (''There are numerous indications that the 
conflict between a journalist's asserted right to protect his confidences and a government tribunal's 
right to compel disclosure of such confidences has recently intensified"); Comment, supra note 27, 
at 221 ("In recent years there has been a vast increase in the number of subpoenas served upon the 
press"); Comment, Journalism's Privilege: In re Farber and the New Jersey Shield Law, 32 
RUTGERS L. REv. 545, 546-47 (1979) ("In the last decade more frequent use of subpoenas against 
journalists increased the media's demand for a reporter's privilege."). 
43. For many years Maryland stood alone in its adoption of a statutory reporter's privilege. 
The Maryland statute, passed in 1896, is discussed in Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 
A.2d 149, ajJ'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). Indeed, no 
other state adopted a statutory privilege unti11933. See Day, supra note 20, at 3. For a discussion 
of the state laws, see infra text accompanying notes 320-73. 
44. As Judge Coffin has stated, ''The task is one that •.• defies formula." Bruno & Stillman, 
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980). 
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BRANZBURG V. HAYE.s45 
A. TheFacts 
Three separate actions were consolidated for consideration by the 
Supreme Court inBranzburg. Because much ofthe Court's opinion cen-
ters on one of the three cases, and because that case involved a contrary 
federal circuit court opinion, the facts in Caldwell v. United States will be 
emphasized here.46 Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, was 
assigned to cover the Black Panthers on the West Coast in the late 1960's. 
During the year 1969, Caldwell wrote numerous articles about the Black 
Panthers and interviewed one of the Panther leaders, David Hilliard. In 
one of these articles, Caldwell pointed out that Hilliard had mad·e refer-
ence to his desire to kill then-President Richard Nixon. This statement 
was reiterated by another member of the Black Panther Party in a publicly 
televised speech.47 
Several subpoenas were issued, the main one simply ordering Cald-
well "to appear . . . to testify before the Grand Jury ... 48 The grand jury at 
that time had been investigating the "aims, purposes and activities, of the 
Black Panther organization.49 Caldwell moved to quash the subpoena and 
requested a protective order from the District Court arguing that he was 
"constitutionally protected from appearing,50 before the grand jury.si 
The trial judge agreed with the view that under some circumstances Cald-
well need not divulge confidential sources. "[H]e need not reveal confi-
dential associations that impinge upon the effective exercise of his First 
Amendment right to gather news . . . until such time as a compelling and 
overriding national interest which cannot be alternatively served has been 
established to the satisfaction of the Court ... 52 The judge disagreed, how-
ever, with the assertion that Caldwell did not even have to appear before 
the grand jury, and found him in contempt of court. The Ninth Circuit 
concurred with the conclusion that Caldwell did not have to reveal confi-
dential sources, but went on to find that Caldwell did not have to appear 
before the grand jury absent a showing of "compelling need, for the 
appearance. 53 
While broad arguments were put forth by some of the parties54 the 
45. 408 u.s. 665 (1972). 
46. The other two consolidated actions ~ involved reporters. Paul Branzburg was a re-
porter for a Kentucky newspaper who refused to give information to the grand jury concerning 
the making of hashish which he had witnessed. Paul Pappas was a reporter for a Rhode Island 
television station who had been present in a Black Panther meeting hall during riots in Massachu-
setts. Before the grand jury, Pappas declined to state what he had been told while in the hall 
(although he did testifY as to what he had seen outside the hall). 
47. 408 U.S. at 677. 
48. Id. at 676. 
49. Id. at 675. 
50. See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and .Developing Qual!fied Privilege for Newsmen, 26 
HAsTINGS LJ. 709, 712 (1975). Mr. Goodale was counsel for the New York Times in Caldwell. 
51. This was the same position taken by both Branzburg and Pappas. See Branzburg v. 
Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971). 
52. 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
53. 434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1970). 
54. See especially the argument made by Branzburg: "Branzburg argued that the state has 
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amici, 55 and by commentators, s6 the facts in the case actually did not call 
for a broad opinion which would be dispositive of the issues that might 
arise in all source cases. As Judge Wright pointed out in a recent case,57 
the facts in Branzburg were quite limited (and "especially compelling"): 
First, each of the reporters called to testify was himself an eyewitness 
to the alleged criminal activity under investigation by the grand jury. 
As a result, the case for disclosure was much stronger than in the 
more common instance where the reporter has merely been informed 
of such activity. . . . Moreover, in Branzburg all three reporters re-
fused not merely to respond to specific questions posed by the grand 
jury, but even to appear before the grand jury in answer to five of the 
six subpoenas. Clearly, refusal to appear presents a far more sweep-
ing claim of privilege from a citizen's duty to offer evidence than 
does a refusal to answer selected questions or provide specific docu-
ments. Finally, in Branzburg there was no question that the grand 
juries were operating in good faith and were in the process of dis-
charging their legitimate function of investigating crime. 58 
The reporters' argument to the court was deceptively straightforward. 
They argued that newsgathering often requires an agreement not to iden-
tify a source or to publish only a part of the information revealed by the 
source; and that forcing the reporter to reveal these confidences to a grand 
jury will deter sources from furnishing information, to the detriment of the 
freedom of communication protected by the first amendment. 59 Moreover, 
the Court made clear that the reporters did not "claim an absolute privi-
lege against official interrogation in all circumstances."60 Still, the difficult 
question was put at issue: "Whether a newspaper reporter who has pub-
lished articles about an organization can, under the First Amendment, 
properly refuse to appear before a grand jury investigating possible crimes 
by members of that organization who have been quoted in the published 
articles."61 The media argued that it should not have to testify or even 
appear before the grand jury unless the reporters had information relevant 
to a crime, the information was unavailable from any other source, and the 
"need for the information is sufficiently compelling to override the claimed 
invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure."62 
the heavy burden of proving that the testimony of the reporter is absolutely necessary to prevent 
direct, immediate and irreparable prospective damage to the national security, human life and 
liberty." Goodale, supra note SO, at 714. 
SS. Among others, the following filed briefs: Radio Television News Directors Association, 
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, American Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors, American Civil Liberties Union, and National Press Photographers Association. 408 U.S. at 
666-67. 
56. See, e.g., Guest and Stanzler, Tlte Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Tlteir 
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969). 
57. Reporters Com. v. American Tel & Tel., 593 F.2d 1030, 1095 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerl. 
denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979) (Wright, J., dissenting). 
58. For a particularly good discussion of the limiting facts in Branzhurg, see Bursey v. United 
States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972). 
59. 408 U.S. at 679-80. 
60. Id. at 680. 
61. Id. at 679 n.16. 
62. Id. at 680. 
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B. The Plurality Opinion 
Before turning to an analysis of Justice White's plurality opinion63 it 
is important to note what the petitioners in Branzburg did not request. 
They specifically did not request an absolute privilege which would allow 
them to ignore inquiries from the grand jury under all circumstances. 
Counsel for Caldwell and the New York Times64 argued ''that so drastic 
an incursion upon First Amendment freedoms should not be permitted 'in 
the absence of a compelling governmental interest-not shown here-in 
requiring Mr. Caldwell's appearance before the grand jury.' "65 In dissent 
Justice Douglas understood this position well, for he railed against it. 
"The New York Times, whose reporting functions are at issue here, takes 
the amazing position that First Amendment rights are to be balanced 
against other needs or conveniences of government.''66 
Strangely, Justice White either misconstrued the reporters' position, 
or chose to interpret it as encompassing an assertion of absolute privilege. 
Indeed, much of the opinion is written as if the media representatives had 
specifically requested that the Court announce an absolute first amend-
ment privilege. 67 The reporters' argument, though, was straightforward 
and hardly advocated an absolute privilege. They asserted that certain 
showings must be made before a reporter could be forced to appear or 
testify before a grand jury or at trial: possession by the reporter of infor-
mation relevant to a crime under grand jury investigation, unavailability 
of the information from other sources, and a sufficiently compelling need 
for the information to override the invasion of first amendment interests.68 
The starting point for Justice White was to evaluate the purported 
restrictions the criminal justice system imposed on the media by requiring 
reporters to appear before grand juries and answer questions. For the four 
plurality Justices, the restrictions were not overly severe. 
But these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no 
prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no 
express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to 
withhold. No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no 
63. The Chief Justice and Justices Black and Rehnquist joined in the opinion. Justice Powell 
filed a concurring opinion. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. See dis-
cussion i'!fra. 
64. The New York Times was represented by Yale Law Professor Alexander Bickel For a 
review of his argument before the Court, see i'!fra text accompanying notes 139-40. 
65. 408 U.S. at 676. 
66. Id. at 713 n.l, Citing the brief filed by the New York Times: 
The three minimal tests we contend must be met before testimony divulging confidences 
may be compelled from a reporter are these: 1. The government must clearly show that 
there is probable cause to believe that the reporter possesses information which is specifi-
cally relevant to a specific probable violation of law. 2. The government must clearly 
show that the information it seeks cannot be obtained by alternative means, which is to 
say, from sources other than the reporter. 3. The government must clearly demonstrate a 
compelling and overriding interest in the information. 
Brief for New York Times as Amicus Curiae at 29. 
67. "If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be, the prospect 
of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory 
solution to the problem. For them, it would appear that only an absolute privilege would suffice." 
Id. at 702 (emphasis added). . 
68. Id. at 680. 
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penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material 
is at issue here. The use of confidential sources by the press is not 
forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any 
source by means within the law. No attempt is made to require the 
press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to dis-
close them on request.69 
Justice White was unable to express much sympathy for the reporters 
when he found that, even in the absence of a common law privilege,70 
reporters historically were able to function effectively.71 He then asked the 
question which springs into the mind of any lawyer reviewing the claim of 
imposition on first amendment rights: What evidence is there to show a 
genuinely serious interference with press process? 
The parties in Branzburg had assembled substantial evidence in sup-
port of their claim of interference with the press process.72 Affidavits had 
been filed by prominent news professionals73 indicating that a lack of a 
reporter's privilege was a serious restriction on the gathering and dissemi-
nation of the news.74 Yet, not surprisingly, the empirical data was not 
clear. In studies conducted before the Court's opinion was issued, some 
journalists were able to say that they relied heavily on the confidential 
source, while others were unable to make that statement.75 
For Justice White, the evidence was inconclusive in two significant 
respects. First, he was uncertain "how often and to what extent informers 
are actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are 
69. Id. at 681-82. 
70. See supra notes 20-45 and accompanying text. 
71. We are admonished that refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter's privilege 
will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But this is not 
the lesson history teaches us. As noted previously, the common law recognized no such 
privilege, and the constitutional argument was not even asserted until 1958. From the 
beginning of our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for 
press informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not 
been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of confidential news 
sources by the press. 
408 U.S. at 698. 
72. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 619-20. 
73. Newscaster Walter Cronkite filed an affidavit with the Ninth Circuit in the Caldwell case. 
He stated: 
Particularly disturbing to me has been a marked increase, recently, in the reticence of my 
confidential sources in government itself. These sources, some of whom have in the past 
been instrumental in exposing instances of governmental abuse or corruption, now tell 
me that, because of the increasingly widespread use of subpoenas to obtain names and 
other confidential information from reporters, they are fearful of reprisals and loss of 
jobs if they are identified by their superiors as sources of information for newsmen. 
74. Blasi analyzed the evidence in some detail See Blasi, supra note 2. 
75. The Court cited one example: 
A number of editors of daily newspapers of varying circulation were asked the question, 
''Excluding one- or two-sentence gossip items, on the average how many stories based on 
information received in confidence are published in your paper each year'/ Very rou~ 
estimate." Answers varied significantly, e.g., "Virtually innumerable," Tucson Dally 
Citizen (41,969 daily eire.), "Too many to remember," Los Angeles Herald-Examiner 
(718,221 daily eire.), "Occasionally," Denver Post (252,084 daily eire.), "Rarely," Cleve-
land Plain Dealer (370,499 daily eire.), ''Very rare, some politics," Oregon Journal 
(146,403 daily eire.). 
408 U.S. at 694 n.32. 
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forced to testify before a grand jury."76 Second, even if some informers 
would be unavailable because of a rejection of the privilege, the plurality 
was not persuaded that preservation of the confidentiality of the informant 
would ''take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecut-
ing those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring 
the commission of such crimes in the future."77 
This latter point was central to the disposition of the case by the four 
Justices.78 It was not enough for the media representatives to come forth 
· with evidence of restrictions on their reporting capabilities that would be 
imposed by a rejection of the privilege. Even if the Court were to believe 
this evidence,79 the question remained whether the newsgather-
ing/dissemination function should "take precedence" over the grand jury 
function. 
The Court emphasized heavily the role of the grand jury in the Amer-
ican criminal justice system. 80 The fifth amendment requires grand jury 
involvement for serious criminal offenses,81 and ''the grand jury is simi-
larly guaranteed by many state constitutions and plays an important role 
in fair and effective law enforcement in the overwhelming majority of the 
States."82 Justice White then turned to the needs of the grand jury with 
respect to outside witnesses. Noting that the grand jury's "investigative 
powers are necessarily broad," the Justice wrote that ''the grand jury's au-
thority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic . . . but essential to its 
task."83 While expressing concern with any negative impact its opinion 
might have on the dissemination of information, the Court considered the 
76. Id. at 693. The point was made even more forcefully elsewhere in the opinion. 
Nothing before us indicates that a large number or percentage of all confidential news 
sources . • . would in any way be deterred by our holding that the Constitution does not, 
as-it never has, exempt the newsman from performing the citizen's normal duty of ap-
pearing and furnishing information relevant to the grand jury's task. 
I d. at 691. 
77. Id. at 695. 
78. It was central also for Justice Powell. See infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text. 
79. It did not. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 691. 
80. Grand jury proceedings are constitutionally mandated for the institution of federal 
criminal prosecutions for capital or other serous crimes, and "its constitutional preroga-
tives are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history." The adoption of the 
grand jury "in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring charges in serious 
criminal cases shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice." 
Id. at 687. 
81. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n)o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a): 
An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An 
offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at 
hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment or, if indictment is waived, it may be prose-
cuted by indictment or by information. 
82. 408 U.S. at 687-88. 
83. I d. at 688. The Court quoted Jeremy Bentham: 
Are men of the first rank and consideration-are men high in office-men whose time is 
not less valuable to the public than to themselves-are such men to be forced to quit 
their business, their functions, and what is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of 
every idle or malicious adversary, to dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as 
far as it is necessary, they and everybody . . • . Were the Prince of Wales, the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same 
coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpen-
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lack of a privilege at common law84 and the needs of the grand jury, and 
declined to create a testimonial privilege "rooted in the Federal 
Constitution."85 
Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for 
the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function 
of government, and the grand jury plays an important, constitution-
ally mandated role in this process. On the records now before us, we 
perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforce-
ment and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient 
to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on newsgather-
ing that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citi-
zens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a 
valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. 86 
Justice White was careful to explain that reporters engaged in pro-
tected activities had some constitutional claims which could be made even 
in the grand jury context. 
Finally, as we have earlier indicated, newsgathering is not without its 
First Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if insti-
tuted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly dif-
ferent issues for resolution under the First Amendment. Official 
harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforce-
ment but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources 
would have no justification. Grand juries are subject to judicial con-
trol and subpoenas to motions to quash. We do not expect courts 
will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the 
First Amendment as well as the Fifth. B7 
Moreover, while the Constitution did not require the privilege, it certainly 
did not prohibit the creation ofprivileges.88 Several times in the opinion 
the Court mentioned that states could enact statutory privileges89 or that 
state courts could interpret state constitutions as imposing a privilege.90 
nyworth of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper 
to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly. 
I d. at 688-89 n.26 (quoting 4 THE WoRKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-21 (J. Bowring ed. 1843)). 
84. "A number of States have provided newsmen a statutory privilege of varying breadth, but 
the majority have not done so ..•• " Id. at 689. The Justice remarked that the "creation of new 
testimonial privileges has been met with disfavor by commentators since such privileges obstruct 
the search for truth." I d. at 690 n.29 (citing Wigmore, Morgan, McCormick, Chaffee and Ladd). 
85. Id. at 689-90. 
86. Id. at 690-91. Justice White explained that no serious hardship would follow from the 
Court's decision: 
This conclusion itself involves no restraint on what newspapers may publish or on the 
type or quality of information reporters may seek to acquire, nor does it threaten the vast 
bulk of confidential relationships between reporters and their sources. Grand Juries ad-
dress themselves to the issues of whether crimes have been committed and who commit-
ted them. Only where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or possess 
information relevant to the grand jury's task need they or the reporter be concerned 
about grand jury subpoenas. 
I d. at 691. 
87. Id. at 707-08. 
88. The issue is not fully settled. See infta notes 356-62 and accompanying text. 
89. "There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to 
fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations 
between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas." 408 U.S. at 706. 
90. "It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from respond-
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The plurality opinion of Justice White in Branzburg is a major disap-
pointment. Where one would have hoped for clarity and· a thoughtful 
evaluation of the competeing interests, one finds, instead, conclusions 
based on one major mistaken assumption and on two great leaps of faith. 
The mistaken assumption is that the media petitioners made no showing 
that reporters would be adversely affected by a rejection of the reporter's 
privilege because there was no clear empirical support for this position. It 
is true that the empirical evidence was not precise on this point. Neverthe-
less, the showing made by the media representatives was most impressive. 
They offered extensive surveys which had been made by able non-journal-
ist experts; these surveys gave strong support to the media's position.9t Ad-
ditionally, many famous and reputable journalists filed affidavits in strong 
support of this position.92 
The Court sidestepped the surveys and opinions by concluding rather 
neatly that "surveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinions of pre-
dicted informant behavior and must be viewed in light of the professional 
self-interest of the interviewees."93 No doubt, this conclusion is sound, for 
some self-interest shows in the affidavits and surveys. Still, the contrary 
evidence was not strong; nothing indicated that the surveys and affidavits 
were plainly wrong. Additionally, it is not certain how anyone could 
prove empirically the claimed adverse impact in an area where first 
amendment interests conflict with other interests. The Supreme Court in 
Chandler v. Florida94 recognized the limitations of empirical proof. The 
Court there allowed for the televising of criminal proceedings over the ob-
jection of the defendants. Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the sparse 
nature of the evidence: "No one has been able to present empirical data 
sufficient to establish the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently 
has an adverse effect."95 The Court found that the "data thus far assem-
bled '[were] 'limited' and 'non-scientific.' "96 By placing the burden on the 
reporters97 in Branzhurg, the Court guaranteed tp.at the media could not 
prevail No one could clearly demonstrate an adverse impact on the media 
by refusing to recognize a privilege.98 Yet, one might legitimately question 
ing in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privi-
lege, either qualified or absolute." I d. 
91. For an excellent analysis of the data, see Comment, Newsmen's Privilege to Withhold In-
formationfrom the Grand Jury, 86 HAR.v. L. REv. 137, 147-48 (1972). 
92. Documents were filed in Caldwell by, among many others, Eric Sevareid, Marvin Kalb, 
and Dim Rather. 
93. 408 U.S. at 694. 
94. 449 u.s. 560 (1981). 
95. Id. at 578-79. 
96. ld. at 576 n.ll. 
97. The Court in Chandler refused to place the burden on the media representatives. I d. at 
578-79. 
98. In the same way that no one could clearly demonstrate lack of prejudice in the Chandler 
case. But see Marcus, The Media in the Courtroom: Allending, Reporting, Televising Criminal 
Cases, 51 IND. LJ. 235, 284 (1982): "Can anyone doubt that-at least in some cases-the televis-
ing of proceedings will have some serious impact on the trial participants, an impact which will 
not be tangible and will not likely lead to appealable issues?" For a similar argument in the 
Miranda setting, see Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, 65 MicH. L. REv. 59 (1966). 
With regard to the historical evidence, the conclusions are mixed. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that no adverse impact could be shown when most states did not recognize the privilege, 
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why the burden should be on the media when it is obvious that at least in 
some cases the impact will be severe.99 
The Branzburg opinion is also disappointing because it accepts as a 
matter of faith the proposition that subpoenaed reporters will be suffi-
ciently protected under traditional limitations on the grand jury. These 
limitations100 are narrowly confined, as the Court simply reiterated that 
the grand jury investigation must be "conducted in good faith" 101 and can-
not amount to "official harassment."l02 The force of such limitations may 
be more apparent than real. To prove "official harassment" would be a 
difficult chore indeed. Moreover, as the United States government con-
ceded in Branzburg, the grand jury "need establish no factual basis for 
commencing an investigation, and can pursue rumors which further inves-
tigation may prove groundless."103 The chief complaint of the media rep-
resentatives was not the practice of conducting bad faith investigations; 
rather, the complaint centered on reporters being ordered to appear when 
the information they possessed was not particularly important and could 
have been obtained elsewhere. 
This latter point, of course, leads to the final leap of faith taken by 
Justice White and the other plurality Justices. Without any extended dis-
cussion, they simply concluded that a qual!fted privilege would unduly in-
terfere with the grand jury function. 104 The New York Times proposal for 
the privilege105 was that: 
(1) The Government must clearly show there is a probable cause to 
believe that the reporter possesses information which is specifically 
relevant to a specific probable violation oflaw. (2) The Government 
must clearly show that the information it seeks cannot be obtained by 
alternative means, which is to say, from sources other than the re-
porter. (3) The Government must clearly demonstrate a compelling 
yet reporters were still seemingly able to report effectively. On the other hand, in most states while 
the privilege was not expressly recognized, few reporters were punished harshly for failure to 
divulge sources. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
99. Certainly, the empirical evidence offered in Branzburg was considerably more persuasive 
and far-reaching than that offered in either New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
or Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In both of those cases, however, the Court 
was willing to greatly limit the common law defamation action in order to safeguard press inter-
ests. In Gertz, Justice Powell in the majority opinion noted that private persons who sue media 
defendants for defamation would have to prove actual-as opposed to presumed-damages be-
cause '5uries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damages to reputation 
without any proof that such harm actually occurred." I d. at 349. Justice White, in dissent, at-
tacked the majority's reliance on nonempirical data. "The Court points to absolutely no empirical 
evidence to substantiate its premise." Id. at 397. 
100. Justice Stewart argued that ''the judiciary has traditionally imposed virtually no limita-
tions on the grand jury's broad investigatory powers." 408 U.S. at 731. For a discussion of his 
dissenting opinion, see infta notes 129-44 and accompanying text. 
101. Id. at 710. 
102. Id. at 707. 
103. See the government's brief in Caldwell, at 11. 
104. It may be permissible to speculate that the reason for such a conclusion is that the plural-
ity Justices still truly saw the media's argument as one espousing an absolute privilege. See supra 
note 67 and accompanying text. 
105. The proposal was adopted almost entirely by the dissenting Justices. See infta note 106 
and accompanying text. 
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and overriding interest in the information.106 
It is difficult to explain why such a balancing test would adversely affect 
the grand jury process in any significant fashion. Many states had adopted 
by statute such a test even as early as 1971 with no apparent disruption of 
the investigative process.107 Moreover, it is useful to reiterate that such a 
balancing test does not contemplate an absolute immunity; that is, if the 
material is relevant, unavailable from other sources, and connected to a 
significant investigation, the reporter will have to divulge sources and 
information. 
The opinion of Justice White is a disappointment. Still, one should 
not overstate its negative impact. Many states have followed the Court's 
suggestion in considering-and adopting-statutory privileges. Even more 
importantly, the Court inBranzburg recognized the constitutional right of 
the media to gather information: ''We do not question the significance of 
free speech, press, or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested 
that newsgathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could 
be eviscerated."108 This principle has been followed by the Court in sev-
eral major First Amendment cases, including Richmond News Papers, Inc. 
v. Virginia 109 and Chandler v. Florida .110 The plurality opinion in 
Branzburg is, therefore, not wholly without redeeming value; however, its 
cavalier treatment of the press' claim is unfortunate. Instead of a thought-
ful weighing of the two important interests-newsgathering and grand jury 
investigations-the Court simply promoted the latter at the expense of the 
former. 
C. The Concurring Opinion 
Lawyers often complain of the great length of Supreme Court deci-
sions, arguing that the opinions are far more detailed than necessary. Yet, 
the initial complaint to be leveled against the extremely shortlll concur-
ring opinion of Justice Powell is its brevity. In this strange opinion, 112 
Justice Powell has created a good deal of confusion resulting in conflicting 
conclusions as to the actual holding in Branzburg. It is a strange opinion 
because in part it agrees with the plurality opinion, and in even larger part 
it appears to agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart.113 Ulti-
mately, however, Justice Powell votes with the plurality. 
A quick review of the opinion would suggest that it is merely a gloss 
106. Brief for the New York Times Co., et al., as AmictiS Curiae, at 29. 
107. For an evaluation of the state statutes, see infra notes 320-73 and accompanying text. 
108. 408 U.S. at 681. 
109. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (open criminal trials). Justice Stevens, concurring in Richmond News-
papers, emphasized that the 1980 decision was the first by the Court in which it "squarely held 
that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever." 
I d. at 582. While Justice Stevens is correct as to the "square holding'' of Richmond Newspapers, 
that holding has roots which can be traced directly to the discussion of Justice White inBranzburg 
v. Hayes. 
110. 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (televising of criminal trials over the objection of the defendants). 
Ill. The opinion is only two pages in the United States Reports. 
112. "Justice Powell's opinion is singularly opaque .... " Goodale, supra note 50, at 709. 
113. See infta notes 129-45 and accompanying text. 
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on Justice White's opinion, for it rejects any explicit constitutional privi-
lege for the reporter to refuse inquiries from the grand jury. The only 
protection expressly given to the media is the same as that given in the 
plurality opinion: "If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation 
is not being conducted in good faith he is not without remedy."114 
Other portions of the opinion indicate that Justice Powell's view of the 
protection offered the reporters is far more expansive than that of Justice 
White. He is careful to point out "what seems to me to be the limited 
nature of the Court's holding."115 That is, the media representatives are 
not "without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or 
in safeguarding their sources."116 More importantly, however, Justice 
Powell seems willing to accept the notion that reporters may be entitled to 
constitutional protection from the grand jury even if the grand jury is not 
proceeding in bad faith. 
Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing 
only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investi-
gation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony 
implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need 
of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to 
quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered. The as-
serted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking 
of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation 
of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal 
conduct117 · 
The statement of one commentator reflects the problematic nature of Jus-
tice Powell's view: 
[S]urely there will be some facts which can be said to make out a 
showing that requested information bears only a remote and tenuous 
relationship to the subject of investigation but that cannot be said to 
demonstrate the bad faith of the grand jury. And the category of 
circumstances where there might be "other reason[s] to believe" a 
source relationship needlessly implicated seems to be explicitly open-
ended.118 
Under a test which utilizes a phrase such as "remote and tenuous relation-
ship," reporters may well be able to go beyond the limits of the plurality 
114. 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
115. Id. at 709. 
116. I d. This statement solidifies the view that the origins of Richmond Newspapers may be 
traced to Branzhurg. See supra note 109. 
117. 408 U.S. at 710. 
118. Comment, Newsmen's Privilege to Witlzlzold Informationftom Grand Jury, 86 HARv. L. 
REv. 137, 145 (1972). But see the statement of Judge Wilkey in Reporters Com. v. American Tel. 
& TeL, 592 F.2d 1030, 1061 n.107 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979): "Although 
Justice Powell refers to case-by-case ''balancing," it is clear that he is actually referring to tlie 
availability of judicial case-by-case screening out of bad faith improper and preJUdicial interroga-
tion." While asserting that a good faith investigation will "always override a joumalist's interest in 
protecting his sources," id. at 1049, Judge Wilkey defined ''bad faith" to include "not only investi-
gations actuated by bad intentions but also investigations that probe at will without relation to law 
enforcement needs and that expose for the sake of exposure." Id. at 1047 n.52. 
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opinion.119 To compound the confusion, however, Justice Powell went on 
to criticize the dissenting opinions for avoiding the 
balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-
by-case basis . . . [by creating] a constitutional privilege not even to 
appear before the grand jury. The new constitutional rule endorsed 
. . . would . . . defeat such a fair balancing and the essential societal 
interest in the detection and prosecution of crime would be heavily 
subordinated. 120 
The opinion of Justice Powell is confusing. Still, one must ultimately 
conquer its ambiguities; as we shall see, 121 this concurring opinion is cen-
tral to any understanding of the meaning of Branzburg v. Hayes and is the 
foundation for the view of many judges that the Court in Branzburg cre-
ated a qualified privilege for reporters. 
D. The Dissenting Opinions 
Only one member of the Court in Branzburg adopted an absolute 
privilege for reporters to refuse to appear and testify before grand juries. 
Following the principle that he and Justice Black so eloquently asserted 
for decades,122 Justice Douglas argued that a media representative should 
never be required to appear before a grand jury unless the "reporter him-
selfis implicated in a crime,"123 a highly unusual situation. InBranzburg, 
Justice Douglas' belief in the absolute position of the First Amendment 
was as unshakable as ever before. "Sooner or later, any test which pro-
vides less than blanket protection to beliefs and associations will be twisted 
and relaxed so as to provide virtually no protection at all."124 Any test less 
than an absolute privilege would have, according to his dissenting opinion, 
"two retarding effects upon the ear and the pen of the press."125 Specifi-
cally, "Fear of exposure will cause dissidents to communicate less openly 
to trusted reporters. And, fear of accountability will cause editors and crit-
ics to write with more restrained pens."126 Moreover, unlike the plurality 
Justices, Justice Douglas fully accepted the media's contention that the re-
jection of a privilege would result in adverse consequences. 
A reporter is no better than his source of information. Unless he 
has a privilege to withhold the identity of his source, he will be the 
victim of governmental intrigue or aggression. If he can be sum-
moned to testify in secret before a grand jury, his sources will dry up 
and the attempted exposure, the effort to enlighten the public, will be 
ended. If what the Court sanctions today becomes settled law, then 
the reporter's main function in American society will be to pass on to 
119. One commentator flatly contended that "Justice Powell did adopt a qualified privilege for 
newsmen .... " Goodale, supra note 50, at 716. 
120. 408 U.S. at 710. 
121. See infta notes 145-66 and accompanying text 
122. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (clear and present danger test); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374· 
(1967) (privacy). 
123. 408 U.S. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 720. 
125. Id. at 721. 
126. Id. 
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the public the press releases which the various departments of gov-
ernment issue.127 
Justice Douglas can hardly be criticized for continuing to promote the 
position of the absolute protection offered by the First Amendment. He 
can be criticized, however, for choosing to ignore the reality that two con-
flicting interests may be involved in the reporter's privilege context. While 
in some cases reporters should not be compelled to testify in front of a 
grand jury, in other cases their appearance might prove essential. In the 
organized racketeering or sabotage case where all other sources of infor-
mation have been exhausted and where the reporter clearly knows the one 
individual connected to the mobsters or saboteurs, it is difficult indeed to 
justify an absolute right to ignore the questions of the grand jury. None of 
the other Justices adopted, and none of the parties128 seriously asserted, 
the absolute privilege. 
Justice Stewart129 was strongly critical of what he characterized as the 
broad opinion of Justice White.I30 The second dissenting opinion centered 
on the need to accommodate two strong, yet competing interests-the 
grand jury investigatory function and the dissemination of information. 
The opinion began by recognizing the value of the grand jury system. 
The grand jury serves two important functions: "to examine into the 
commission of crimes" and "to stand between the prosecutor and the 
accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon 
credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will." 
And to perform these functions the grand jury must have available to 
it every man's relevant evidence.I3I 
Unlike Justice White, however, Justice Stewart evaluated the grand 
jury interest with a careful eye to the lack of limitation~ imposed on the 
grand jury. 
[T]he vices of vagueness and overbreadth that legislative investiga-
tions may manifest are also exhibited by grand jury inquiries, since 
grand jury investigations are not limited in scope to specific criminal 
acts, and since standards of materiality and relevance are greatly re-
laxed. For, as the United States notes in its brief in Caldwell, the 
grand jury "need establish no factual basis for commencing an inves-
tigation, and can pursue rumors which further investigation may 
prove groundless."I32 
If the first amendment interest were shown to be vital, it would be 
perfectly consistent with current and traditional practice to allow for a re-
porter's privilege. While generally persons must testify before a grand 
jury, this "rule has been limited by the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth 
127. Id. at 722. 
128. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
129. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stewart. 
130. "[T]he Court in these cases holds that a newsman has no First Amendment right to pro-
tect his sources when called before a grand jury." 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He 
later referred to ''the Court's rejection of any newsman's privilege." I d. at 744. 
131. Id. at 737. 
132. Id. at 742-43. 
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Amendment, and the evidentiary privileges of the common law."I33 Ac-
cording to the dissenters, the First Amendment interest in this context is 
vital. The First Amendment guarantee is " 'not for the benefit of the press 
so much as for the benefit of all of us' . . . . Enlightened choice by an 
informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is pre-
mised, and a free press is thus indispensable to a free society."134 
The real question in the case for the dissenters therefore, was whether 
the rejection of a privilege would adversely affect these first amendment 
interests. The answer was given resoundingly in the affirmative. Taking a 
view contrary to the plurality Justices, they believed that the impact on the 
media would be very severe. They stressed preliminarily the "obvious" 
fact that "informants are necessary to the newsgathering process as we 
know it today."135 They went on to rely on the trial court's finding of fact, 
that compelled disclosure of information received through confidential re-
lationships jeopardizes the relationships and impairs the journalistic 
process.136 
The dissenters concluded that a rejection of the privilege would have 
a negative impact on the grand jury system as well as on the newsgathering 
function. 
People entrusted with law enforcement responsibility, no less than 
private citizens, need general information relating to controversial 
social problems. Obviously, press reports have great value to govern-
133. /d. at 737. 
134. I d. at 726 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)). The dissenters discussed 
in more detail than the plurality or concurring opinion the constitutional right to gather news. 
"No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information. News must 
not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to 
publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some 
dimensions, must exist." ld. at 728. See generally Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 
1976). 
135. The dissenters continued: 
If it is to perform its constitutional mission, the press must do far more than merely print 
public statements or publish prepared handouts. Familiarity with the people and cir-
cumstances involved in the myriad background activities that result in the final product 
called "news" is vital to complete and responsible journalism, unless the press is to be a 
captive mouthpiece of "newsmakers." 
It is equally obvious that the promise of confidentiality may be a necessary prereq-
uisite to a productive relationship between a newsman and his informants. An office-
holder may fear his superior; a member of the bureaucracy, his associates; a dissident, 
the scom of majority opinion. All may have information valuable to the public dis-
course, yet each may be willing to relate that information only in confidence to a reporter 
whom he trusts, either because of excessive caution or because of a reasonable fear of 
reprisals or censure for unorthodox views. 
408 U.S. at 729-30. Justice Stewart expressed great doubt about Justice White's reliance on the 
lack of empirical support for the petitioners' position. 
Empirical studies, after all, can only provide facts. It is the duty of courts to give legal 
significance to facts: and it is the special duty of this Court to understand the constitu-
tional significance of facts. We must often proceed in a state ofless than perfect knowl-
edge, either because the facts are murky or the methodology used in obtaining the facts is 
open to question. It is then that we must look to the Constitution for the values that 
inform our presumptions. And the importance to our society of the full ftow of informa-
tion to the public has buttressed this Court's historic presumption in favor of First 
Amendment values. 
ld. at 736 n.l9. 
136. I d. at 732 n.l2. 
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ment, even when the newsman cannot be compelled to testify before 
a grand jury. The sad paradox of the Court's position is that when a 
grand jury may exercise an unbridled subpoena power, and sources 
involved in sensitive matters become fearful of disclosing informa-
tion, the newsman will not only cease to be a useful grand jury wit-
ness; he will cease to investigate and publish information about 
issues of public import. I cannot subscribe to such an anomalous 
result, for, in my view, the interests protected by the First Amend-
ment are not antagonistic to the administration of justice. Rather, 
they can, in the long run, only be complementary, and for that reason 
must be given great "breathing space."l37 
To accommodate the two interests which had apparently conflicted in 
the three consolidated cases, the dissenters would have required that the 
_government make a strong showing before reporters could be compelled to 
appear and testify before the grand jury.138 The test proposed by the dis-
senters139 is indistinguishable from that proposed by Professor Bickel in 
his brief on behalf of the New York Times: 
[T]he government must (1) show that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a 
specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the informa-
tion sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive 
of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and 
overriding interest in the information.140 
The dissenters' view of both the evidence and the broader interests 
served by granting a reporter's privilege is correct. Can there be serious 
question that a lack of privilege will discourage at least some important 
confidential relationships and thus deprive the public of information it 
should possess? Moreover, the test proposed by the Justices does not seem 
overly stringent. The government must demonstrate only that the interest 
is quite important to a serious investigation and that it cannot obtain the 
information elsewhere. It is difficult to understand why such a test would 
adversely affect the grand jury process in many cases. 
Two criticisms have been leveled at the dissenters' proposal. The first 
is that the proposal goes too far; the second, that it does not go far enough. 
Justice Powell argued forcefully that the dissenters' test should not be used 
to exempt journalists from appearing before the grand jury.141 It truly may 
137. Id. at 746. 
138. The dissenters explained that the need for such a stringent test arises from Supreme 
Court precedent dealing with the type of investigation which "impinges on First Amendment 
rights ... " Id. at 739. 
Governmental officials must, therefore, demonstrate that the information sought is 
clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject of governmental inquiry. They must 
demonstrate that it is reasonable to think the witness in question has that information. 
And they must show that there is not any means of obtaining the information which is 
less destructive of First Amendment liberties. 
Id. at 740. 
139. See Goodale, supra note SO, at 714. 
140. 408 U.S. at 743. 
141. The precise application of the dissenters' test is unclear, for the opinion constantly merges 
the concepts of appearing and testifying. Still, there is at least one fairly clear indication that the 
Justices would generally allow the reporter to refuse to appear. 
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be futile for the reporter to appear and then refuse to testify, as argued by 
the dissenters. Nevertheless, Justice Powell is correct that the right of re-
fusal to appear is too great an accommodation to the media. 
It is to be remembered that Caldwell asserts a constitutional privi-
lege not even to appear before the grand jury unless a court decides 
that the Government has made a showing that meets the three pre-
conditions specified in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart. 
To be sure, this would require a "balancing" of interests by the court, 
but under circumstances and constraints significantly different from 
the balancing that will be appropriate under the court's decision. 
The newsman witiless, like all other witnesses, will have to appear; 
he will not be in a position to litigate at the threshold the State's very 
authority to subpoena him. Moreover,. absent the constitutional pre-
conditions that Caldwell and that dissenting opinion would impose 
as heavy burdens of proof to be carried by the State, the court-when 
called upon to protect a newsman from improper or prejudicial ques-
tioning-would be free to balance the competing interests on their 
merits in the particular case. The new constitutional rule endorsed 
by that dissenting opinion would, as a practical matter, defeat such a 
fair balancing and the essential societal interest in the detection and 
prosecution of crime would be heavily subordinated.l42 
It has also been argued that the dissenters' formulation is too narrow, 
for only an absolute privilege would adequately protect reporters' interest 
in maintaining confidential relationships. Interestingly enough, on this 
point both Justice White and Justice Powell were in agreement. 143 The 
answer to this criticism, however, is that the first amendment interest can-
not be evaluated in the abstract. The issue arises only because of a pur-
ported conflict with the grand jury process. There may be cases in which 
the testimony of a reporter is vital to the investigation of serious criminal 
endeavors. In such cases the dissenters would reject a claim of privilege, 
and in this writer's view, correctly so. While the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the important function of the first amendment, it has been careful to 
engage in thoughtful balancing when that function conflicts with other in-
terests, especially those associated with the criminal justice system.144 To 
do any less here would be to raise grave questions about the vitality of 
other sections of the Bill of Rights. 
This is not to say that a grand jury could not issue a subpoena until such a showing were 
made, and it is not to say that a newsman would be in any way privileged to ignore any 
subpoena that was issued. Obviously, before the government's burden to make such a 
showing were triggered, the reponer would have to move to quash the subpoena, assen-
ing the basis on which he considered the panicular relationship a confidential one. 
Id. at 743. 
142. Id. at 710 (emphasis added) (Powell, J., concurring). 
143. Id. at 702, 709. 
144. See generally Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (televising of criminal trial over 
the defendant's objection); Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (open 
criminal trials); Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (gag orders/prior 
restraints). 
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E. The Meaning of Branzburg 
Even a thorough reading of the four opinions in the Branzburg case 
will not lead to an absolutely certain understanding of the holding in the 
one Supreme Court decision 145 that dealt with the notion of reporter's 
privilege.146 Four members of the Courti47 appear strongly to conclude 
that there is no privilege under any circumstances that would specially give 
a media representative the right to refuse to answer grand jury inquiries.148 
Four members of the Court149 strongly disagree with this view and believe 
that the reporter should have, under the first amendment, a right to refuse 
requests by the grand jury. Justice Douglas would make this right abso-
lute.150 The Justices who signed Justice Stewart's opinion would limit the 
privilege, but only if the government makes a strong showing of compel-
_ling need for the particular information. 
These three opinions cover eight members of the Court-four against 
any privilege, four in favor of a limited or broad privilege. What then, is 
the holding in Branzburg? A reading of the cases since the Court's deci-
sion; noting especially cases decided very recently, lSl makes reasonably 
certain that the "p1inciple" to be derived from the case is "controlled by 
the concurring opinion of Justice Powell as the fifth Justice of the 
majority."152 
145. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) involves a related but different issue. See Infra text 
accompanying notes 284-94. 
146. One commentator noted that since the decision, "confusion is manifest ..• [The opinion 
is] not a model of clarity." Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731, 760-61 
(1977). He went on to state: ''Branzburg is reconcilable with a principled theory of the free press 
guarantee." I d. at 762. See also Comment, Newsmen's Privilege to Withhold Information ftom 
Grand Jury, 86 HAR.v. L. REv. 137, 141 (1972); Comment, Newsmen's Privilege JWo Years Ajier 
Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in Jeopardy, 49 TuL. L. REv. 417, 423 (1975). 
147. The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined with Justice White. 
148. The plurality did state that there is some constitutional protection for the newsgathering 
process. This conclusion is of major dimension, as indicated previously, note 109,supra. Still, the 
only protection offered to the media before the grand jury is related to a showing of harassment or 
bad faith, a showing which can be made by any person required to appear before the grand jury. 
149. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and the author of the major dissent, Justice 
Stewart. 
ISO. Justice Douglas recognized a limited exception; no privilege would attach to the extent 
that ''the reporter himself is implicated in a crime." 408 U.S. at 712. 
151. A review of these cases is a luxury available to this writer, but unavailable to the many 
commentators and judges who dealt with the problems immediately after the decision in 
Branzburg. This may explain the tremendous difference in both judicial and academic percep-
tions between those in the late 1970's/1980's and those in the early 1970's. The earlier writers and 
judges viewed Branzburg as a case which rejected any privilege. See infra note 165. 
152. United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (execution of contempt judg-
ment). See also McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Arizona, 680 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 
(1982) ("(The Powell opinion) is particularly important in understanding the decision"); Note, 
Source Protection in Libel Suits Ajier Herbert v. Lando, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 351 (1981) ("As 
Justice Powell's concurrence was necessary to make a majority, his position may significantly 
influence the ultimate scope of the holding"); Comment, Reporter's Privilege, 58 DEN. L.J. 681, 
685 (1981) (''The deciding, and somewhat qualifYing, vote was cast by Justice Powell); Note, Me-
dia Law, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 170, 171 (1981) ("Justice Powell's concurrence was the deciding vote and 
has been adopted as the legal standard for the newsman's privilege."); Note, Evidentiary Privilege, 
6 U. DAYTON L. REv. 251, 256 (1981) (''Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion is more relevant 
than the opinion of the majority."). But see Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 211, 
124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1976) ("dicta by a concurring justice ..• is 
not binding. . ."). 
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. As indicated previously, determining with certainty the meaning of 
Justice Powell's opinion is a difficult task. This determination, however, 
has been made somewhat less complex by constructions given to the opin-
ion by many judges, including Justice Powell. Soon after the decision in 
Branzburg, the Supreme Court was faced with a question involving access 
by the media to the prisons. In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 153 Justice 
Powell wrote a separate opinion in which he discussed his view of the 
holding in Branzburg. Beginning with the recognition that the Court had 
rejected a broad privilege, Justice Powell emphasized that in Branzburg 
the "Court did not hold that the government is wholly free to restrict press 
access to newsworthy information."l54 
To the contrary, we recognized explicitly that the constitutional guar-
antee of freedom of the press does extend to some of the antecedent 
activities that make the right to publish meaningful: ''Nor is it sug-
gested that newsgathering does not qualify for First Amendment pro-
tection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of 
the press could be eviscerated." We later reiterated this point by not-
ing that "newsgathering is not without its First Amendment protec-
tions. . . ." And I emphasized the limited nature of the Branzburg 
holding in my concurring opinion: ''The Court does not hold that 
newsmen, subpoenaed to testifY before a grand jury, are without con-
stitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safe-
guarding their sources." In addition to these explicit statements, a 
fair reading of the majority's analysis in Branzburg makes plain that 
the result hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests 
involved in that case rather than on any determination that Fir-st 
Amendment freedoms were not implicated.1ss 
This language in Saxbe would certainly lead readers to conclude that 
Powell meant to stress that he believed the proper test to be a balancing, or 
"assessment" one, rather than a rejection of the first amendment principle. 
This is precisely the position taken by most lawyers who have considered 
the issue in recent times. Some judges and commentators conclude with-
out question that a "limited privilege with respect to the disclosure of con-
fidential sources is recognized."l56 Others tend to link the opinions of 
Justices Stewart and Powell, rather than Justices White and Powell. One 
judge remarked thai ''the concurring opinion of Justice Powell and the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart have similar overtones, as both find it 
necessary to balance First and Sixth Amendment interests."157 Other 
judges are even more direct, noting that "if one aligns Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion with Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan 
153. 417 u.s. 843 (1974). 
154. Id. at 859. 
155. Id. at 859-60. 
156. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 33 Conn. Sup. 204, 206, 370 A.2d 
1095, 1097 (1976). See also Reporters Com. v. American Tel & Tel, 593 F.2d 1030, 1085 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., dissenting}, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979); Note, Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. 
REv. 167, 172 (1978); Comment, The Fallacy if Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional 
Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 299, 314 (1979). 
157. Matter of McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 18, 408 N.E.2d 697, 707 (1979). See also 
Goodale, supra note ?O, at 717-18. 
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and Marshall, and with Justice Douglas' dissent, a majority of five justices 
accepted the proposition that journalists are entitled to at least a qualified 
First Amendment privilege."158 
It is this writer's view that labeling Justice Powell's opinion in a cer-
tain fashion, or attempting to connect it directly to the dissenting opinions 
is more a hindrance than a help, as the real question is how Justice Powell 
would respond to a qualified privilege claim. Instead, the best approach 
may be the one taken by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States 
v. Liddy, 159 where the court used the opportunity to analyze the Powell 
opinion. The conclusion reached is the equivalent of that offered previ-
ously in this Article.160 "[T]here is no universal constitutional privilege of 
a newsman to keep confidential the identity of his sources and the content 
of their revelations."161 When .first amendment interests are involved, as 
they so often are, however, the judge must follow the view set out in Jus-
tice Powell's opinion. At that point, in the words of the Vermont Supreme 
Court, the judge must balance "between the ingredients of freedom of the 
press and the obligation of citizens, when called upon, to give relevant 
testimony relating to criminal conduct."162 
The now widely accepted view of Branzburg, therefore, is that it was 
limited by the specific facts presented to the Justices in the consolidated 
cases163 and that the case-by-case analysis must be used by trial judges in 
"balancing freedom o~ the press against a compelling and overriding pub-
lic interest in the information sought."164 While this view is not univer-
sally held, 165 it is certainly the clear majority position, especially in federal 
courts.166 An understanding of Branzburg is essential in this area. It is not, 
however, enough. The facts in Branzburg were quite limited.167 What 
would happen when the reporters appeared before th~ grand jury and 
158. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com'n v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
See also Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D. Va. 1976); Higdon, The 
Burger Court and tlte Media: A Ten Year Perspective, 2 W.N. ENG. L. REv. 593, 649 (1980). 
159. 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
160. See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text. 
161. 478 F.2d at 586. 
162. State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 269, 315 A.2d 254, 255 (1974). 
163. One court characterized Branzburg as simply the case in which "the Supreme Court de-
cided that a journalist does not have an absolute pnvilege under the First Amendment to refuse to 
appear and testify before a grand jury to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the 
commission of crime." Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979). 
164. Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 618, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287 (1978). 
165. See, e.g., People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 854, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011 (1975) (''The 
Branzburg Court laid to rest the notion that newsmen were entitled to either a conditional or an 
absolute testimonial privilege under the free press clause of the First Amendment"); Petition of 
McGowan, 298 A.2d 339, 341 (Del. 1972), rev'd 303 A.2d 645; Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. NJM Assoc., 
180 NJ. Super. 459, 470-71, 435 A.2d 572, 578 (1981); Gagnon v. District Ct., 632 P.2d 567, 569 
n.2 (Colo. 1981); In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259, 268, 394 A.2d 330, 334, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 
(1978). The issues are discussed more fully, i'!fra notes 168-91 and accompanying text. 
166. See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975) (Branzburg "appears to have 
fashioned at least a partial First Amendment shield"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1976); State v. 
Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 574-75, 581 P.2d 812, 814-15 (1978); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502 
(N.H. 1982); Altemose Constr. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 
1977). 
167. Caldwell did, to reiterate, refuse even to appear before the grand jury claiming a very 
broad First Amendment privilege unless the government demonstrated a compelling interest. See 
supra notes 57, 65 and accompanying text. · 
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presented a compelling case for nondisclosure of sources or information? 
What would happen when the refusal of the journalist was made in a crim-
inal trial rather than during an investigation? Finally, what would happen 
when the reporter declined to give information in a civil case? It is to these 
questions that we now tum. 
THE PROBLEM AREAs 
A. Reading Branzburg 
As we have seen, the "true" holding in the Branzburg case is hardly 
self-evident.16S Judges handling matters in this area were therefore faced 
with the extreme difficulty of attempting to understand the case and to 
apply the perceived holding to the facts in the individual actions before 
them. Without the guidance of specific statutes, 169 judges could be found 
to have wandered in any one of at least three directions. 
The earliest reaction to Branzburg, particularly by state judges, was to 
conclude that, in denying the privilege, the plurality opinion had wholly 
disposed of any media claims.170 The majority judges in the well-known 
Farber case stated that the United States Supreme Court "squarely held 
that no such First Amendment right exists. . . . [This court does] no 
weighing or balancing of societal interests. . . . The weighing and balanc-
ing has been done by a higher court."171 In a more recent case, one federal 
judge declared that in the grand jury context, the government's interest 
will "always override a journalist's interest in protecting his source."172 
Most federal judges, and many state judges, disagreed with this view 
and read Branzburg as conferring a qualified privilege to refuse disclosure 
even in certain grand jury proceedings.173 Many of the judges relied heav-
ily on Justice Powell's opinion to find a "privilege of nondisclosure. . . [in 
which the test is] balancing freedom of the press against a compelling and 
overriding public interest in the information sought."174 
Some state courts had a somewhat more direct approach to the prob-
lem. These judges looked to state statutes designed to deal with the re-
168. See supra notes 145-167 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Evidentiary Privi-
lege, 6 U. DAYTON L. REv. 251, 260 (1981). 
169. See i'!fra notes 320-62 and accompanying text 
170. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). 
171. 78 NJ. at 266-68, 394 A.2d at 333-34. 
172. Reporters Com. v. American TeL & TeL, 593 F.2d 1030, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979). This certainly seems to be the position Justice White has continued 
to take. In an application for a stay in the Farber case, supra note 170, Justice White wrote in 
chambers: 
There is no present authority in this Court either that newsmen are constitutionally privi-
leged to withhold duly subpoenaed documents material to the prosecution or defense of 
a Criminal case or that a defendant seeking the subpoena must show extraordinary cir-
cumstances before enforcement against newsmen will be had. 
New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 1322 (1978) (White, J., in chambers). 
173. See. e.g., State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 574, 581 P.2d 812, 814 (1978) ("The United 
States Supreme Court recognized the privilege in Branzburg"). 
174. Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 618, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287 (1978) overruled State v. 
Dean, 103 Wise. 2d 228, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981). See generally Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 
1059 (9th Cir. 1972), where the court carefully analyzed the various opinions in Branzburg and 
concluded that the balancing approach "is not impaired by Branzburg." I d. at 1091. 
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porter's privilege question and simply viewed Branzburg as a somewhat 
immaterial exercise by the Supreme Court.175 In other states where no 
statutory privilege existed, state supreme court justices considered their 
own state constitutional provisions and found that a qualified privilege ex-
isted.176 Even where the provisions were almost identical to the language 
contained in the first amendment to the United States Constitution, the 
privilege was found.I77 
Federal judges, who obviously did not have the luxury of other consti-
tutional provisions or statutes on point, sought other ways in which to ap-
ply a qualified privilege without casting doubt on the validity of the 
plurality opinion inBranzburg. Soon after Branzburg, great attention was 
given to Ru1e 501 of the Federal Ru1es of Evidence. This rule provides: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United 
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a wit-
ness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall 
be governed by the principles of the common law as they might be 
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason 
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with re-
spect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law sup-
plies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law.178 
The language of the Ru1e is intentionally vague.179 The key phrase is that 
judges in determining privilege shou1d look to the "light of reason and 
experience." In spite of the apparently contrary view of Justice White and 
three other Justices, many federal judges seized upon this language to de-
clare that, in the media representative context, ''the court-s should continue 
to develop the federal common law of privilege on a case-by-case ba-
sis."180 And develop they did. 
One court noted that the legislative history of the Rule indicated that 
the language ''was designed to encompass . . . a reporter's privilege not to 
disclose a source."ISI Another panel of judges found a common law privi-
175. See i'!fra notes 320-62 and accompanying text 
176. Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977). 
177. Of course, even where the language in the state and federal constitutions is virtually 
identical, state courts have never been reluctant to hold that the state document requires more of 
the government than the federal instrument requires. See, e.g., State v. Menne, 380 So. 2d 14 (La. 
1980) (state supreme court gave the Miranda requirements a far more expansive reading than that 
given by the United States Supreme Court), cert. denied, Louisiana v. Menne, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). 
178. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
179. See H. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 8 (1973). 
180.' Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 238 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975). 
181. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979). The court went on to state: 
The original draft of the Rule defined nine specific nonconstitutional privileges, but 
failed to include among the enumerated privileges one for a reporter or journalist. The 
Advisory Committee gave no reason for the omission. This was one of the primary 
focuses of the congressional review of the proposed evidentiary rules, stemming in part 
from the "nationwide discussions of the newspaperman's privilege." Following testi-
mony on behalf of groups such as the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the 
privilege rule was revised to eliminate the proposed specific rules on privileges and to 
leave the law of privilege in its current state to be developed by the federal courts. 
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lege, based "on the strong public policy supporting the unfettered commu-
nication to the public of information and opinion . . . grounded in the first 
amendment."182 Though casting its privilege in terms of the common law 
requirement, this same court "found support for this privilege inBranzhurg 
v. Hayes ... where the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of 
first amendment protection for newsgathering."I83 
Most judges evaluating the holding of Branzhurg have taken one of 
the three routes which allow for the use of a qualified reporter's privilege. 
Today, few judges cling to the view that under no circumstances is there a 
privilege. Recognition of the privilege, however, is but a necessary first 
step. Great problems regarding definition and application of that privilege 
remain even today. In construing the privilege, the preliminary question 
as to the application of Branzhurg must relate to the specific factual con-
text presented to the judge. In the three consolidated cases in Branzhurg, 
the grand juries were investigating allegations of very serious crimes.I84 In 
many cases, however, even in the criminal context that type of situation 
will not be present. 
It is perfectly proper to emphasize the interest in viable grand jury 
investigations of serious criminal offenses, a point made by many judges. 
Judge McGowan stated this well in a famous libel action, Carey v. 
Hume:Iss 
This is a civil libel suit rather than a grand jury inquiry into crime, 
and the dispute over disclosure is between the press and a private 
litigant rather than between the press and the Government. This dif-
ference is of some importance, since the central thrust of Justice 
White's opinion for the Court concerns the traditional importance of 
grand juries and the strong public interest in effective enforcement of 
the criminal law. Justice White also relied on the various procedures 
available to prosecutors and grand juries to protect informants and 
on careful use by the Government of the power to compel 
testimony.186 
612 F.2d 708, 714-17. 
[W]e refer to the following comment by Congressman Hungate, the principal draftsman 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
For example, the Supreme Court's rule of evidence contained no rule of privilege 
for a newspaperperson. The language of Rule 501 permits the courts to develop a 
privilege for newspaperpeople on a case-by-case basis. The language cannot be in-
terpreted as a congressional expression in favor of having no such privilege, nor can 
the conference action be interpreted as denying to newspaperpeople any protection 
they may have from state newspersons' privilege laws. 
120 Cong. Rec. H. 12253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (explaining the final Conference 
Report version of the Rules). 
Id. at 714 n.6. 
182. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 
(1981). 
183. I d. See also the discussion the listing of authorities in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
Com'n. v. N.F.L., 89 F.R.D. 489, 492-93 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
184. In Caldwell, for example, the crime under consideration was conspiracy to assassinate the 
President of the United States. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
185. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974). 
186. I d. at 636 n.6. See also State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499, 503 (1982): "[B]ecause 
the individual citizen's civil rights must be protected, 'a news reporter's privilege is more tenuous 
in a criminal proceeding than in a civil case. . . .' " . 
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This point is unquestionably legitimate in the case in which the grand jury 
is investigating allegations (found in a reporter's story) about the sale of 
drugs187 or in the case in which the reporter was supposed to have received 
information concerning a murder.188 In many grand jury investigations, 
however, such an independent crime is not what is at issue. In Farr v. 
Pitchess, 189 for instance, the reporter was thought to have information 
concerning the infamous Charles Manson case-not information regard-
ing the murders themselves, but rather information as to the question of 
which person leaked statements to the public in violation of an order 
prohibiting public dissemination. Similarly, in Morgan v. State, 190 the in-
vestigation centered on which party had told the reporter about the con-
tents of a sealed indictment.191 In these situations, the government interest 
may be viewed as somewhat less compelling than that presented in the 
-investigation of crimes independent of the investigatory process. "[T]he 
purpose [is] to force a newspaper reporter to disclose the source of pub-
lished information, so that the authorities [can] silence the source."192 
It is also true that the investigatory process itself may be subject to 
vigorous questioning as to scope and process. To give a disturbingly 
coarse example is to illuminate the problem. In Ealy v. Littlejohn, 193 the 
grand jury was investigating the killing of a citizen by a police officer. A 
civil rights organization labeled the investigation process a farce; at that 
point the grand jury ordered leaders of the organization to appear, alleg-
edly to give information which might be relevant to the investigation. The 
leaders of the organization brought an action, however, when the grand 
jury began asking questions about the membership of the organization and 
the finances of the group. The Fifth Circuit upheld the leaders' action: 
''we fail to see . . . how the subject of League finances was of any legiti-
mate concern to the grand jury."194 
Even when the grand jury process runs rampant, as in Ealy, one can 
still analyze the process vis-a-vis the role and function generally of the 
grand jury. In other criminal cases, however, it is not the grand jury which 
is involved at all. For example, there have been cases in which the investi-
gating agency was the state attorney general's office.195 In such cases, the 
traditional deference given to the grand jury process would not necessarily 
be present.196 
In many criminal cases, direct requests are made of reporters for 
187. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972), affd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 
212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). 
188. In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (1979). 
189. 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1981). 
190. 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976). 
191. See also Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1976); Pankratz v. District Court, 199 Colo. 411, 609 P.2d 1101 (1980). 
192. Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 956 (Fla. 1976). 
193. 569 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1978). 
194. I d. at 230. 
195. In re McGowan, 303 A.2d 645 (Del 1972). 
196. Indeed, in the McGowan case, id., the court held that such an investigation was beyond 
the authority of the attorney general's office. 
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sources or information 197 not by the grand jury, but instead by the defend-
ant or by the prosecuting attorney. A typical fact pattern may be found in 
United States v. Cuthbertson .198 The defendant there had been charged 
with conspiracy and fraud in connection with a franchising operation. Re-
porters for the television show "60 Minutes" extensively investigated the 
franchising system involving the defendant and interviewed many of the 
principals. The defendant requested the notes and tapes of these inter-
views from the CBS producers and reporters.199 In a case in which the 
media representative has extensive information concerning the defendant 
and the alleged crime, the defendant may be able to make a compelling 
case for disclosure. In such a case, the reporter may have become "an 
investigative arm of the state as he and the prosecution joined forces 
against the defendant."200 
It is becoming increasingly common for government attorneys to re-
quest information from journalists to assist in the preparation of the prose-
cution's case. While the traditional role of the grand jury would not, of 
course, be present in such a situation, the interests of the state would re-
main the same but in a more direct fashion. When the government re-
quests the information via the prosecuting attorney, the case is typically 
ready to go to trial, well after grand jury deliberations. In such a situation 
it is, as one commentator stated, "extremely unlikely that the [courts] will 
impose more stringent standards on a prosecutor seeking information for 
use at trial, when the state's interest in compelling testimony is admittedly 
more substantial."201 
If the judge concludes that reporter's privilege should be invoked in a 
given matter, the analysis is not complete; the judge must also consider 
other constitutional rights present in the case. In many cases in which the 
reporter refuses to disclose information in response to a request by a crimi-
nal defendant, that defendant may claim that the deprivation of the infor-
mation violates his constitutional rights. Often, the defendant does not 
detail the constitutional basis for this claim, but simply refers to the need 
for a fair trial.2°2 It would appear, however, that there are two principal 
bases for such a claim. First, the deprivation of important information 
may affect the defendant's ability to fully present his case, raising due pro-
cess concerns. Second, being unable to call the reporter as a witness may 
violate the sixth amendment right to compulsory process.203 Indeed, in 
197. This distinction is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 213-14. 
198. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). 
199. After remand the Third Circuit held that the journalists would not have to give up the 
information as other sources for this information existed. 651 F.2d 189, 196 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1056 (1981). See also People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1975); 
"People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1975). 
200. Farber v. Job, 467 F. Supp. 163, 168-69 (D. NJ. 1978). 
201. Murasky, supra note 15, at 891. 
202. See. e.g., State v. Boiardo, 82 NJ. 446, 449-50, 414 A.2d 14, 16 (1980); CBS, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978); State v. Jascalevich, 158 NJ. 
Super. 488, 386 A.2d 466 (1978). 
203. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part, that ''in all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall [have) the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . . ." 
While most courts speak in terms of the right to compulsory process, some courts in this area refer 
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evaluating a defense claim, one court has gone so far as to note that the 
First Amendment privilege is not actually expressed in the Constitution, 
but "[i]n contrast the Sixth Amendment . . . guarantees an explicit right to 
the defendant 'to have compulsory process. . . .' "204 
Supreme Court precedent casts grave doubt on the constitutionality of 
any sort of absolute reporter's privilege which would always prevail 
against an asserted need by the defendant.205 Three cases in particular are 
relevant here. In Chambers v. Mississippi,206 the defendant was prevented 
by state law from cross-examining a witness who confessed to the crime for 
which the defendant was on trial. The Supreme Court struck down the 
defendant's conviction. 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in es-
sence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's 
accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and 
to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. 2o1 
Similarly, in Washington v. Texas ,2°8 the Court closely guarded the de-
fendant's right to present his case. A Texas statute prohibited co-defend-
ants from testifying for one another. The defendant claimed that he was 
denied favorable testimony of a witness who would exonerate him. The 
Court found that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process ap-
plied to the states, and the defendant's conviction was reversed. 
Perhaps the most important of the three cases is .Davis v. Alaska ,209 
where state law created a privilege for juvenile offenders on probation. 
Under this law the defendant was precluded from establishing that the 
witness was on probation. The defendant could therefore not impeach the 
witness by demonstrating that the witness may have had an interest in pro-
viding favorable testimony. Weighing the state's interest in the legislative 
privilege-protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders-against the de-
fendant's right to present evidence, the Court found a constitutional viola-
tion, in that 
defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the 
facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the wit-
to the confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 160 Ga. App. 
830, 287 S.E.2d 677 (1982). 
204. People v. Zagarino, 97 Misc. 2d 181, 189, 411 N.Y.S.2d 494, 498 (1978). This reference to 
explicit language in the Constitution is confusing. Certainly, the sur.reme Court has not been 
deterred by any lack of express constitutional reference to the term 'privacy'' in seminal cases 
such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (information about contraception) and Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortions). 
205. The assertion will not always relate to a claimed need for information. In Farr v. Pitch-
ess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1978), the trial judge ordered the 
reporter to disclose the name of the party who had given him information that was to be kept from 
the public. The purpose of this order was to protect the defendant's right ''to a fair trial, free of 
prejudicial publicity." I d. at 467. Other constitutional arguments are discussed below in the text 
accompanying notes 354-60. 
206. 410 u.s. 284 (1973). 
207. I d. at 294. 
208. 388 u.s. 14 (1967). 
209. 415 u.s. 308 (1974). 
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ness. Petitioner was thus denied the right of effective cross-examina-
tion which ''would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and 
no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it."210 
845 
By this discussion of support for the defendant's constitutional claims, 
I do not mean to suggest that the defendant will automatically be entitled 
to complete disclosure by the reporter. The trial judge must engage in a 
balancing process, weighing the defendant's need for the information 
against the reporter's need to maintain confidentiality.211 What I am sug-
gesting is that the trial judge must do what the Supreme Court in .Davis 
did-utilize a thoughtful balancing process-as "a defendant does not 
have an absolute right to obtain confidential information from a newsper-
son."212 There has never been such an absolute right in connection with 
other privileges; there should be no such absolute right with the reporter's 
privilege.2I3 Unhappily, once again no clear formula or straightforward 
answer to the tough questions can be found. 
Before turning to the manner in which judges should resolve the privi-
lege claim in criminal cases, a last matter must be discussed. To this point 
in the Article, I have implied that the request of the reporter214 was for a 
single item: the confidential source, the name of the person(s) from whom 
the journalist received certain information. To suggest that this is the only 
type of request present, however, is to unfairly load the equation. In some 
cases it is the i'!formation received by the reporter rather than the source of 
the information which is at issue. In such cases, some courts are willing to 
distinguish the case from that in which the source was requested, finding 
less of a threat to the newsgathering function.21s 
The more difficult problem occurs when it is the source who is sought, 
but it is not established that the reporter had a confidential relationship 
with that source. Lewis v. United States216 is a well-known example of this 
problem. The manager of a radio station received in the mail tape record-
ings and a written message from an underground group, the Symbionese 
Liberation Army, suspected of bombings and other terrorist activities. 
During the process of investigating these acts, the grand jury requested the 
tapes and message. While the request was not directly for the source, it 
was clear that the purpose of the request was to use the tapes and message 
210. Id. at 318. 
211. This balancing process is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 224-43. 
212. In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (1979). 
213. See generally Comment, Tlze Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg v. Hayes: Wither 
Now'!, 64 J. OF CRJM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 218, 222-23 (1973). See also Note, Reporters and 
their Sources: Tlze Constitutional Right to a Co'!folential Relation, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 347 n.131 
(1970): 
Although the Sixth Amendment grants the defendant the right of compulsory process, 
that Amendment was adopted to guarantee the defendant the same right of process as 
that provided the prosecution by common law. This right to compulsory process does 
not override exemptions from disclosure protected by . . . statutes. . . . 
214. This was the case whether the request was by the grand jury, the prosecuting attorney, or 
the defense in a criminal case. 
215. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972). See generally Note, Branzburg 
Revisited· Tlze Continuing Search For A Testimonial Privilege for Newsmen, 11 TULSA LJ. 258, 270 
(1975). 
216. 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975). 
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to find out who the sender/source was. No showing of a prearranged con-
fidential relationship was made; still, the station claimed that it was privi-
leged to deny the grand jury's request. The court did not dispose of the 
issue of confidentiality, for it found that under any circumstances the 
grand jury requests were "overwhelmingly . . . legitimate and justi-
fied."217 In a case in which the source no longer wished to maintain the 
confidential relation, the court stressed that confidentiality was "irrelevant 
to the chilling effect" on the newsgathering process.218 For this court, the 
question was whether the first amendment function was being tampered 
with, not whether the relationship with the source happened to be confi-
dential.219 Indeed, in some jurisdictions it is made clear that the privilege 
is fully the reporter's and that the source cannot make any claims based 
upon it. The Indiana experience is typical. In a 1970 case, the state 
supreme court held that the defendant could not object to the reporter's 
compelled disclosure of a conversation, as the right to object was there-
porter's personally.22° Five years later, an intermediate state court explic-
itly held that the privilege in this area could only be invoked by the 
reporter, not by the source.22I 
A related question arises in the situation in which the information 
sought from the journalist deals with her own personal observation as a 
witness, rather than as a reporter who was given information by others. As 
stated by one commentator, ''when courts are presented with the question 
of the witnessing of a crime by a reporter, they usually require the reporter 
to testify."222 While the answer to the question may not be quite so appar-
ent in cases in which the reporter witnesses the event because she was in-
vited to the scene by a confidential informer,223 often that issue does not 
arise. A recent federal case demonstrates the principle well. The reporter 
in the case of In re Ziegler224 ''happened to be in the situation that can 
only be envied by most other newsmen."225 While waiting outside a court-
room, the reporter witnessed a fight between two alleged organized crime 
figures. The grand jury requested that the reporter appear to testify about 
the incident, but he refused. The court rejected the journalist's first 
amendment claim, viewing the case as the same as that in which the ordi-
nary citizen observed criminal activity. 
While it may be "inherently unpleasant" to testify to the same 
incident before a Grand Jury, it is one of the highest duties of citizen-
ship imposed upon all of us by the Constitution. That Constitution 
does not immunize him from testifying merely because he makes the 
observation as a news reporter. The ordinary citizen would not be 
217. Id. at 423. 
218. United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982). See generally United 
States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). 
219. 534 F. Supp. at 297. But see People v. Zagarino, 97 Misc. 2d 181, 411 N.Y.S.2d 494 
(1978); In re Daclc, 101 Misc. 2d 490, 421 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1979). 
220. Lipps v. State, 254 Ind. 141, 258 N.E.2d 622 (1970). 
221. Shindler v. State, 166 Ind. App. 258, 335 N.E.2d 638 (1975). 
222. Goodale, wpra note 50, at 720. 
223. People v. Dan, 341 A.D.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1973). 
224. 550 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
225. Id. at 532. 
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excused from testifying as to what he observed and the First Amend-
ment cannot be given an interpretation which would grant him im-
munity from testifying simply because he made these observations 
while on duty as a reporter. . . . 
In a sense, this case is a logical extension of the Branzburg case. 
In Branzburg, the reporter's eyewitness account of an incident was 
relevant to the Grand Jury's investigation of that particular incident. 
In the instant case, Mr. Ziegler's testimony is not needed by a Grand 
Jury investigating the assault Mr. Ziegler witnessed. Rather, his tes-
timony is relevant to an investigation of which the incident Ziegler 
witnessed is but one small part. Nonetheless, the legal principle 
Branzburg stands for is no less applicable to the instant case, that a 
reporter, the same as any other citizen, must testify before the Grand 
Jury as to what he has personally observed.226 
B. Criminal Cases 
847 
In criminal cases, as previously indicated, most courts today have 
adopted a balancing test when a source or information is requested from a 
reporter: Whether under state law, federal law, or a broad reading of the 
holding in Branzburg,227 these courts require trial judges to engage in 
some sort of weighing process before resolving the privilege assertion.228 
In addition to requiring a balance, they may also impose fairly stringent 
procedural require;IDents during the evaluation process. Many courts, for 
instance, will routinely hold an in camera hearing with the reporter and 
may even speak to the source before reaching a determination.229 Other 
courts may establish quite clearly the burdens ofproof,230 the need for the 
judge to make specific findings in the record, and the opportunity to appeal 
the judge's decision immediately.231 
The procedures are no doubt important, and they certainly should be 
established before any proceeding goes to the hearing stage. The crucial 
question, however, is one of substance: What is the test to be utilized in 
balancing the interests? One judge set forth a five-part analysis:232 
1. The potential chilling effect on future news stories. 
2. The public interest served by disclosure. 
3. The existence of alternative sources for the information. 
226. Id. 
227. "[T]he concurring opinion of Justice Powell and the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart 
have similar overtones, as both find it necessary to balance First and Sixth Amendment interests." 
In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 18, 408 N.E. 697, 707 (1979). 
228. See, e.g., State v. Boiardo, 82 NJ. 446,414 A.2d 14 (1980); People v. LeGrand, 67 A.D.2d 
446, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1979). 
229. State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 259, 444 A.2d 499, 503 (N.H. 1982). 
230. For example, in In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259, 292, 394 A.2d 330, 346, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
997 (1978), the court found the reporter to have the burden "to make aprimafocie showing that he 
is a newsperson and that he obtained the subpoenaed materials in the course of his newsgathering 
duties." At that point the burden shifted to the defendant ''to make a threshold showing" as to the 
elements found in the balancing test. See infra text accompanying notes 232-33. 
231. 78 NJ. at 284, 394 A.2d at 347 (dissenting opinion). 
232. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190,238-39, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427,464-65 (1975) 
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
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4. The relevance of the inquiry. 
5. The impact of the process on the rights of others. 
While this test would appear to encompass the factors considered impor-
tant by Justice Powell as well as Justice Stewart inBranzburg, most courts 
avoid the first and fifth elements. Such an avoidance is unfortunate. I 
would prefer to see the First Amendment interests placed at the forefront 
of the balance, so that judges would be required to make specific findings 
on the record regarding these interests. Nevertheless, in formulating the 
test most courts look only to three elements: the relevance of the informa-
tion in the case, the compelling need for the information, and the unavaila-
bility of the information from "other sources less chilling of First 
Amendment freedoms."233 
Relevance. The question here is whether the information sought is 
truly helpful in the action or whether a "fishing expedition" is being con-
ducted. Will the information aid in the proof of the crime? Will it assist 
the defendant in resisting conviction? As stated by one district judge, 
"[does the] inquiry [go] to the heart of the matter .... [or does it appear] 
that the subject to be disclosed is irrelevant or immaterial."234 A state 
court's formulation is similar. In rejecting a request for disclosure, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the information sought "was at best 
tangential . . . only remotely relevant to the issues at hand."235 
In some cases the judges carefully scrutinize the claimed relevance 
and look closely at the facts which the information is supposed to uncover. 
In United States v. Orsini,236 the defendant claimed due process violations 
in connection with his arrest. He asked that aN ewsweek reporter disclose 
information received during an investigation of a story on methods of the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (the arresting office). The court examined the 
defendant's claims and found that, even if believed, they would not entitle 
him to any relief under the Due Process Clause. The request was, there-
fore, denied. Such a review is to be contrasted with that found in cases 
such as State v. Sandstrom, 237 a recent Kansas case. There the reporter 
was said to have information regarding the identity of a declarant who was 
purported to have said that he was threatened by the victim of the murder. 
On first blush, it would appear that such information would be relevant to 
a number of questions involving motive, self defense, and identification. 
The court thus required disclosure. Unfortunately, as noted by the dis-
senting judge, the case did not involve questions of motive, self defense, or 
identification; the only defense raised was insanity. 
233. United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982). See also United States 
v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 359 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). 
234. United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972, 981 (W.D. Pa. 1976), qff'd, 545 F.2d 864 (3d 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). 
235. Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 620, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287 (1978), overruled, State v. 
Dean, 103 Wise. 2d 228, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981). In this case the defendant claimed that the 
information was relevant to an entrapment defense. The court affirmed the first degree murder 
conviction. 
236. 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), qffd, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 
u.s. 997 (1977). 
237. 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (1978), cerl. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979). 
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Need. Even if the information sought would be of some assistance in 
the government or defense case, most courts will not direct the reporter to 
disclose sources or confidential information unless this data would be of 
great importance in the disposition of the case. The Virginia Supreme 
Court stated the test in the following way: "[The case] must be substan-
tially dependent upon what the testimony of the source might be. . . . 
[T]he privilege of confidentiality should yield only when the . . . need is 
essential to a fair trial."238 If the information would prove a necessary 
element of the government's case or would establish an affirmative de-
fense, it is obviously essential that the information be given.239 In many 
cases, however, the need is not so clearly shown. 
The most vexing problem concerns privileged information which 
would assist one side in the impeachment of a witness for the other side. 
Typically, the problem arises when the lawyer claims that the reporter has 
information (or has a source with the information) which would show a 
prior inconsistent statement by the trial witness. Some courts are willing, 
with no additional proof, to order disclosure by the reporter to facilitate 
this impeachment.240 Other courts require a greater need, finding that it is 
not enough "to show that a . . . witness had made prior statements incon-
sistent with statements at trial."24I 
The "need" element has been the subject of debate, with some jour-
nalists contending that many courts accept without question the lawyers' 
claims that the information is of genuine significance to the presentation of 
their case. They "say that the Government vastly overestimates the quan-
tity and quality of the information that is given to the press. Why, these 
reporters ask, should their source relationships be put in jeopardy when 
they really can contribute nothing new to the factual inquiry?"242 
Unavailability. The third element of the balancing test is also 
designed to insure that reporters will not be required to jeopardize confi-
238. Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429,430-31 (Va.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). 
239. See, e.g., Pankratz v. District Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Colo. 1980), where the reporter 
was "a central witness . . . he is allegedly the only person who was present during the entire 
period, from the beginning of the meeting ... to its conclusion." See generally People v. 
Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1975); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 370 
N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1975). · 
240. In Hurst v. State, 160 Ga. App. 830, 831, 287 S.E.2d 677, 679 (1982), the court specifically 
held that to deny the defendant this information would be to impose a "restriction on appellant's 
constitutional right to compel witnesses to testify. . . ." This conclusion may be a bit too dra-
matic, for in Hurst there were other witnesses who could have corroborated the source's story. 
241. Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). 
242. Blasi, supra note 2, at 261. Professor Blasi went on to write: 
I d. 
A frequently voiced complaint is that newsmen are sometimes . . . forced to the witness 
stand to give cumulative evidence that is already a matter of public record. There are 
other situations, some newsmen believe, in which the Government subpoenas reporters 
to avoid blowing the cover on its own agents who have infiltrated dissident movements. 
We asked the respondents to what they primarily attributed the recent spate of subpoe-
nas: "It's just an easy way to get information and the freedom of the press be damned." 
"Laziness, inept investigative procedures and a disrespect for the press and a misunder-
standing of its role." . . . "Police sometimes are too lazy or not well enough trained to 
build up their own cases." 
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dential relationships if the information sought from them is not truly nec-
essary. That is, if the defense or prosecution attorneys could find this 
information elsewhere, they must attempt to do so. Normally the trial 
judge must make a finding that "all suggested alternate sources had been 
carefully explored and found wanting. . . ."243 One judge characterized 
the test as a showing "that no less intrusive means of gaining the informa-
tion are extant."244 Virtually all judges are in agreement that the moving 
party cannot seek the reporter's information or source as a first step; rather, 
other efforts must first have been made. Of course, the obvious question is 
how strictly this requirement will be enforced. Based upon a review of the 
recent cases in this area, one must say that the requirement is often being 
very strictly enforced. For instance, in United States v. Cuthhertson,245 the 
defendant requested the name of the reporter's source. He argued that 
without this source he would only be able to find the important informa-
tion by speaking with all persons on the long list of potential witnesses. 
The court rejected the request, noting that the defendant would prevail 
only if he could prove "that his only practical means of access to informa-
tion sought is through the media."246 
C. Civil Actions 
Immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, most 
judges and commentators had no difficulty concluding that even the ap-
parently confining plurality opinion would not likely apply to non-crimi-
nal actions.247 Justice White's opinion had emphasized the vital function 
of the grand jury,248 an important consideration obviously not present in 
the civil context. As Judge Wright put it: "[Branzburg is not controlling 
in] civil cases, where the public interest in effective criminal law enforce-
ment is absent. . . ."249 Nor in civil actions is the defendant's liberty at 
issue as in some criminal actions where the defendant requests informa-
243. State v. Boiardo, 82 NJ. 446, 462, 414 A.2d 14, 22 (1980). See also In re Farber, 78 N.J. 
259, 282, 394 A.2d 330, 341 (Hughes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). 
244. 78 NJ. at 292, 394 A.2d at 346 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
245. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). 
246. United States v. Cutherbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 195 (3d Cir.), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 
(1981). 
247. See generally Note, Newsperson's Privilege and the New York Stale Shield Law: A Propo· 
sal, 43 ALB. L. REv. 918, 925-26 (1979). 
248. [T]he countervailing interests are less compelling. . . than in grand jury proceedings. 
Justice White's opinion repeatedly stressed that law enforcement, "securing the safety of 
the person and property of the citizen," is a fundamental function of government. The 
opinion also emphasized the key role the grand jury plays in effectuating law enforce-
ment objectives. The plurality observed that grand jury proceedings are mandated by 
the federal constitution and by the constitutions of most states, and that society's interest 
in detecting and prosecuting crime is so pronounced that citizens have a special duty to 
convey information about criminal activity to government officials. 
Note, Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 338, 355 (1981). 
249. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Mazzella v. Philadelphia 
News Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("interests that (civil) litigants have in forcing 
disclosure are typically not as compelling."); Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 
510 (E.D. Va. 1976) (in civil cases the interests in disclosure are ''much less weighty than those 
involved in criminal proceedings"). 
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tion250 from the media representative. 
As a consequence, most judges in state and federal civil actions pause 
only briefly in finding that Branzburg is not controlling.251 This finding is 
but a starting point, however. Surely, in some civil cases compelled disclo-
sure by a journalist will be appropriate.252 Moreover, it is even more accu-
rate to say in the civil setting than in the criminal that the claim will be 
raised in a wide variety of contexts.253 Thus, it is important to begin here 
with the questions of whether the reporter has a privilege and how that 
privilege is to be applied. 
It is now well established in all federal circuits and in most states that 
journalists have a qualified privilege to refuse to disclose confidential 
sources when requested in civillitigation.254 In the federal courts, judges 
primarily have reached this conclusion by noting the non-criminal nature 
of the action and-as in the criminal case-construing Justice Powell's 
concurring opinion in Branzburg as conferring such a privilege. 255 These 
judges carefully scrutinize requests for information in light of the heavy 
burden imposed by the first amendment. "But the press' function as a vital 
source of information is weakened whenever the ability of journalists to 
gather news is impaired. Compelling [disclosure in civil actions] may sig-
nificantly interfere with this newsgathering ability. . . ."256 
State judges also look to the first amendment as establishing a privi-
lege in civil actions. In many cases, however, state judges in the civil con-
text grant the privilege under common law principles, emphasizing the 
"increasing importance of journalists to convey information to citi-
zens .... "257 Judges are not reluctant to act on behalf of the media in the 
civil context because there is little fear that constitutional rights of other 
individuals will be infringed. In the criminal action, the judge may prop-
erly hesitate because of a concern that the defendant's right to present evi-
dence will be seriously restricted if a privilege is recognized.258 In the civil 
case, even with the defamation action, no such right is normally at issue.259 
250. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text. 
251. Most, but not all, judges do so. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Ct., 364 Mass. 
317, 325, 303 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1973), where the court found that there was no privilege so that 
disclosure is required unless there is a finding that the requests constitute "unnecessary harass-
ment or frivolous inquiries." 
252. Disclosure would be appropriate, for example, in the situation where the reporter is the 
plaintiff. A strong case can also be established for disclosure in the defamation action where the 
reporter is the defendant and has the only access to the most relevant source of information in the 
case. See discussion below. 
253. A few states have statutes which specifically deal with the civil action, creating an abso-
lute privilege. See, e.g., Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176,200,445 A.2d 376,389, cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 211 (1982). Most states-and the federal system-do not have such broad 
statutes. 
254. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 96 F.R.D. 10, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1982), and cases cited 
therein. See generally Note, Media Law, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 170 (1981). 
255. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper, Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980); In re 
Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982). 
256. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
257. Senear v. Daily Journal American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1982). 
258. See supra notes 201-13 and accompanying text. 
259. That the initiation of a civil action is not a matter of constitutional dimension was settled 
by the United States Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). See Maressa v. 
New Jersey Monthly, 89 NJ. 176, 200, 445 A.2d 376, 385, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 211 (1982). 
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The existence of the privilege, therefore, is not subject to great doubt,26o 
What may be subject to some doubt, however, is the manner in which the 
privilege is invoked and applied. 
The problem is especially acute due to the incredibly varied civil ac-
tions in which the privilege claim is made. Within the past decade the 
courts have seen the issue arise in the following sorts of cases: antitrust 
suits,26I securities matters,262 will contests,263 defamation actions in which 
the media representative was not a party,264 civil suits against the govem-
ment,26S labor proceedings,266 judicial inquiries,267 and a host of other 
civil actions.268 Given such a broad category of cases, it is not surprising 
that judges have been quite creative with respect to remedies short of total 
disclosure. It has been suggested, for example, that disclosure could be 
deferred until late in the discovery process to enable normal routes of dis-
covery to uncover the information; a referee could be appointed to ex-
amine the reporter's notes, and then a seal could be placed on them.269 
Additional protection could be afforded the reporter by restricting use of 
the information solely to the litigation.270 In short, the options are "lim-
ited only by the needs of the situation and the ingenuity of the court and 
counsel."271 
As indicated previously in connection with criminal prosecutions and 
investigations, often the reporter will not be asked to disclose purely confi-
dential sources of information. In the criminal context, the courts may 
then be less inclined to grant a privilege, considering the important inter-
ests present. In the civil setting, however, courts are reluctant to require 
disclosure even if the source is no longer confidential272 or if the informa-
260. In many civil actions the term "privilege" is never used in denying the litigant's request 
for information from a journalist. In many cases, under traditional rules of discovery, the request 
is not honored. Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Mover, 533 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1976); Note, Source Prolec· 
tion in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 338, 348 (1981). 
261. In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 
(1982); Gulliver's Periodicals Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 
1978). 
262. S.E.C. v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (l98l);In re Forbes 
Magazine, 494 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
263. Newburn v. Howard Hughes Medicallnst, 95 Nev. 368, 594 P.2d 1146 (1979). 
264. Application of Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
265. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
266. United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976); Conn. St. Bd. of Labor Rei. 
v. Fagin, 33 Conn. Supp. 204, 370 A.2d 1095 (1976). 
267. In re Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 411 N.E.2d 466 (1980). 
268. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (lOth Cir. 1977); Maughan v. N.L. Indus., 524 F. Supp. 93 (D.D.C. 1981); 
Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Times Pub. Co. v. Burke, 375 
So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1979). 
269. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper, Co., 633 F.2d 583, 598 (1st Cir. 1980) (The 
court "has available to it a range of actions that can be tailored to the needs of sensitive 
balancing."). 
270. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
u.s. 1041 (1981). 
271. Bruno, 633 F.2d at 598. 
272. Altemose Constr. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 
1977); Times Pub. Co. v. Burke, 375 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1979). As stated in Maughan v. N.L. Indus., 
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tion is not secret.273 The extreme example is probably United States v. 
Stee!hammer,214 where the reporter attended a general meeting held by a 
union. The reporter received the same information from the same sources 
as hundreds of other persons, yet he refused to respond to a judge's ques-
tions regarding the meeting.275 On appeal the court agreed with the re-
porter, finding that if the reporter were required to disclose this 
information, it "would as a practical matter result in the closing of future 
meetings. . . . "276 
While courts are most protective of reporters' interests generally in the 
civil context, in two specific types of cases disclosure has been ordered 
rather consistently. The first involves the situation in which the reporter is 
the plaintiff making allegations of wrongdoing by the defendants; the de-
fendants in discovery ask the names of the persons who have information 
concerning the allegations of wrongdoing, but the reporter refuses to dis-
close. In such a case, the reporter has little chance of protection. The most 
famous of these cases is Anderson v. Nixon,211 in which columnist Jack 
Anderson sued a number of principals in the Watergate affair, including 
former President Richard Nixon. Anderson asserted that the defendants 
conspired to retaliate against his sources and to damage his credibility 
before the public. The defendants asked who his sources were, a relatively 
routine discovery request. Anderson refused to divulge his sources and 
asked that the court order disclosure only if, after weighing the various 
interests, his disclosure would be the only way in which vital information 
would be available· to the parties.278 The court recognized that a balancing 
process was often used in both criminal and civil cases in which the privi-
lege question arose.279 In this situation, however, the court refused to en-
gage in the process, where Anderson was "attempting to use the First 
Amendment simultaneously as a sword and a shield."28° 
524 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D.D.C. 1981 ): "[T]he qualified privilege acknowledged in Branzhurg extends 
to resource materials. . . ." 
273. Application of Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) ("[T]hey seek to examine the reportorial and editorial processes."). 
274. 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976). 
275. The judge had entered a temporary restraining order forbidding the calling of a strike. 
The questions of the reporter were asked to find out which members of the union hierarchy had 
violated the order. Id. at 375. 
276. Id. at 377. 
277. 444 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1978). 
278. Id. at 1199. 
279. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text. 
280. 444 F. Supp. at 1199. The court explained: 
Here the newsman is not being obliged to disclose his sources. Plaintiffs pledge of 
confidentiality would have remained unchallenged had he not invoked the aid of the 
Court seeking compensatory and punitive damages based on his claim of conspir-
acy. . . . But when those he accuses seek to defend by attempting to discover who his 
sources were, so that they may find out what the sources knew, their version of what they 
told him, and how they were hurt, plaintiff says this is off limits-a forbidden area of 
inquiry. He cannot have it both ways. Plaintiff is not a bystander in the process but a 
principal. He cannot ask for justice and deny it to those he accuses. . . . Where, as 
here, it is the newsman himself who has provoked the legal controversy about which his 
confidential sources may have relevant information, any ''balancing" seems most unreal-
istic. Having chosen to become a litigant, the newsman is not exempt from those obliga-
tions imposed by the rule of law on all litigants in the federal courts. 
Id See also Campus Communications v. Freeman, 374 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1979). For a twist on 
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The second category of cases in which judges are generally less pro-
tective of media representatives is the defamation action in which the pub-
1isher is the defendant. This matter arises with great frequency in both 
federal and state courts.281 In these cases judges may determine that the 
discovery request made by the plaintiff can be disposed of under the usual 
discovery rules.282 In cases in which the normal rules are not helpful, 
however, courts are faced with a very serious dilemma in which the ag-
grieved party seeks out purportedly vital information while the reporter 
complains of interference with the newsgathering process.2s3 
The beginning point of analysis is the Supreme Court's decision in 
Herbert v. Lando .284 The Court in that case dealt with an important prob-
lem which traced its roots to the earlier decision in New York Times v. 
Sullivan.285 In New York Times, the Court found that, due to first amend-
ment considerations, public officials286 who sue for defamation must prove 
malice, defined as either knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for 
the truth.287 The key is that the plaintiff must focus on the defendant's 
subjective state of mind in order to prevail in a defamation action.288 
In Herbert, a retired army officer sued the producers of the television 
show, "60 Minutes," claiming ..that he had been defamed in one of the 
programs. Under the New York Times standard, he was required to prove 
malice, by clear and convincing evidence. During the course of discovery, 
Herbert requested information regarding the editorial process, conversa-
tions which had taken place among the editors, and details of the decision-
making process. The producers of the show refused to disclose such infor-
mation, claiming a privilege. In disagreeing with the "60 Minutes" produ-
cers, the Supreme Court employed a test balancing "the plaintiffs need for 
the disclosure against the publisher's claim of confidentiality of the edito-
rial process which encompassed both the publisher's and the public's inter-
est in the free flow of information."289 As explained by the Fifth Circuit: 
Herbert held that the press had no First Amendment privilege 
against discovery of mental processes where the discovery was for the 
the usual situation, see Newburn v. Howard Hughes Medical Inst., 95 Nev. 368, 594 P.2d 1146 
(1979), where a reporter voluntarily gave information to some of the litigants but not to others. 
281. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (lst Cir. 1980); 
Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 96 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 1982); Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Senear v. Daily Journal American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 
641 P.2d 1180 (1982); Gagnon v. District Court, 632 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1981); Caldero v. Tribune 
Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977). 
282. Note, Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 338 
(1981): "In many defamation cases, the identity of the source will not be material to the question 
of culpable state of mind and thus disclosure will be unnecessary." I d. at 347. 
283. See generally Note, Newsperson's Privilege and the New York Stale Shield Law: A Propo-
sal, 43 ALB. L. REv. 918, 925-26 (1979). 
284. 441 u.s. 153 (1979). 
285. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
286. The rule was later extended to apply to public figures as well. See the discussion in Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332-39 (1974). 
287. 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
288. This point was made clear in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968): ''There must 
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731. 
289. Mize v. McGraw-Hill, 86 F.R.D. 1, 3 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (discussing Herbert v. Lando). 
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purpose of determining whether malice existed. . . . [T]he Supreme 
Court reasoned that requiring disclosure of journalists' thought 
processes would have no chilling effect on the editorial process; the 
only effect would be to deter recldessness.29o 
855 
It is perhaps true, as some have argued, that Herbert is not dispositive 
of the question of disclosure of sources in defamation cases.29I After all, 
the case dealt with disclosure of the editorial process rather than of confi-
dential sources. Still, the case is highly relevant to the question at issue, 
for it evinces a desire by the Supreme Court to utilize a balancing test in 
the defamation area rather than to employ an absolute privilege on behalf 
of the media. Most courts to consider the application of Herbert have 
agreed with this view. The court in Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 
Inc .292 stated the matter forcefully: "It is untenable to impose the heavy 
New York Times burden ofproofupon plaintiff and at the same time pre-
vent him from obtaining the evidence necessary to meet that burden."293 
As explained by a federal district judge: 
The media defendant cannot have it both ways: he cannot enjoy 
the protection afforded by the heavy burden imposed upon the public 
official plaintiff by New York Times and at the same time enjoy a 
privilege that prevents the plaintiff from obtaining the evidence nec-
essary to carry that burden. Were the media defendant allowed to 
have it both ways, he would have absolute license, and the libel 
plaintiff would have no recourse in the courts. As the Court stated in 
Herbert, "Only complete immunity from liability for defamation 
would [protect the press from the burdens of defamation litigation], 
and the Court has regularly found this to be an untenable construc-
tion of the First Amendment."294 
Herbert, then, seems to have had no remarkable impact on the analy-
sis in this area. No magic formula or rule can be taken from that case to 
clarify the questions in the area of the reporter's privilege for confidential 
sources. Once the moving party has made a showing of a good faith, seri-
ous claim,295 the trial judge will be confronted with a most difficult ques-
tion. Two cases will be helpful in answering this question, with opinions 
written by outstanding jurists. The opinions provide insight into the rele-
vant evaluation process. Potter Stewart, while serving on the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal, wrote the opinion for the court in Garland v. 
Torre .296 In this case, actress Judy Garland sued a reporter, claiming she 
had been defamed in an article that quoted an unnamed network source. 
Garland attempted to find out who the source was before she subpoenaed 
the reporter. The court rejected the reporter's claim of privilege, finding 
290. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980}, cert. denied, 450 
u.s. 1041 (1981). 
291. Note, supra note 280, at 358: "Herbert does not provide authority for requiring disclo-
sure of confidential sources in libel actions." I d. 
292. 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980). 
293. I d. at 685-86. See also Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 
(1978). 
294. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D. Hawaii 1981). 
295. Id. at 886; Saxton, 264 Ark. at 137, 569 S.W.2d at 117. 
296. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). 
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that the information was important to a serious claim and was unavailable 
from other sources. 297 
Judge Carl McGowan in Carey v. Hume298 shed even greater light on 
the question. The plaintiff was an official of the United Mine Workers 
accused of unlawfully removing documents from his office during the 
course of an investigation. The reporter's story was based entirely on in-
formation received from an unnamed source, whom the plaintiff could not 
locate. The reporter was required to disclose the name of the source. The 
court explained that the reporter could not have an absolute privilege to 
refuse to disclose significant information in this context. 
The courts must always be alert to the possibilities of limiting im-
pingements upon press freedom to the minimum; and one way of 
doing so is to make compelled disclosure by a journalist a last resort 
after pursuit of other opportunities has failed. But neither must ligi-
gants be made to carry wide-ranging and onerous discovery burdens 
... We have rejected the only contention made to us by appellant, 
and that was the pre-Branzhurg claim that there either is, or should 
be, an absolute First Amendment barrier to the compelled disclosure 
by a newsman of his confidential sources under any circumstances. 
That was not, in our view, the law before Branzhurg, and it is cer-
tainly not the law after, in either civil or criminal proceedings.299 
The principle to be gleaned from these cases may be stated as follows: 
In civil cases generally, and in defamation cases in particular, the resolu-
tion of the reporter's privilege claim is to be made on a case-by-case basis. 
This principle is, of course, not surprising; it is consistent with the views 
generally expressed in the criminal context300 and with the position of the 
Supreme Court in the editorial privilege case, Herbert v. Lando .301 Virtu-
ally every court to confront the issue of the reporter's privilege in civil 
actions has agreed that a balancing approach to the problem must be 
taken, with a heavy emphasis on the particular facts found in each case.302 
297. Without question, the exaction of this duty impinges sometimes, if not always, upon 
the First Amendment freedoms of the witness. Material sacrifice and the invasion of 
personal privacy are implicit in its performance. The freedom to choose whether to 
speak or be silent disappears. But "[t]he personal sacrifice involved is a part of the neces-
sary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public." 
If an additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here in-
volved, we do not hestitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitution 
to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice. "The right to sue and 
defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right 
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government." 
Id. at 549 (citations omitted). 
298. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974). 
299. I d. at 639. See also Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. NJ.M. Assoc., 180 N.J. Super. 459, 435 A.2d 572 (1981), 
rev'd, 89 NJ. 212, 445 A.2d 395, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 212 (1982). 
300. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text. 
301. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). 
302. See, e.g., In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 103 
S. Ct. 215 (1982); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 
708 (3d Cir. 1979); Gulliver's Periodicals Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 
(N.D. Ill. 1978); Senear v. Daily Journal American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982); 
Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977). 
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Moreover, the balancing test to be utilized here is almost identical to that 
found in the criminal setting: 
First and foremost, is the information sought a "critical element" of 
the plaintiffs cause of action?; does it "go to the heart" of the plain-
tiffs case? Second, has the plaintiff "demonstrated specific need" for 
the evidence?; is the information otherwise not reasonably available 
to him? Third, has the plaintiff made a showing that his claim is not 
"without merit"?303 
To state the formula more concisely: (1) is the information relevant, 
(2) can it be obtained from other sources, and (3) is there a compelling 
need for the information?304 
Relevance. In civil actions, judges typically require a showing of more 
than mere relevance or materiality. As Justice Stewart stated in the Gar-
land case, the information must go "to the heart of the plaintiffs claim."305 
Moreover, because of the balance present in the civil setting, these judges 
very closely scrutinize claims regarding the application of the doctrine. 
Once again, Judge McGowan's thoughtful opinion in Carey v. Hume is of 
assistance in analyzing the problem. The plaintiff, a public figure, had 
been accused of improperly removing documents from the UMW office 
during the course of an investigation. The reporter's charge was based 
upon information given to him by a single source. The identity of the 
source, therefore, appeared "to go to the heart of appellee's libel ac-
tion. . . ."3°6 The court, in requiring disclosure, explained: 
It would be exceedingly difficult for appellee to introduce evidence 
beyond his own testimony to prove that he did not, at any time of 
day or night over an indefinite period of several weeks, remove 
boxfuls of documents from the UMW offices. Even if he did prove 
that the statements were false, Sullivan also requires a showing of 
malice or reckless disregard of the truth. That further step might be 
achieved by proof that appellant in fact had no reliable sources, that 
he misrepresented the reports of his sources, or that reliance upon 
those particular sources was reckless. 
Knowledge of the identity of the alleged sources would logically 
be an initial element in the proof of any of such circumstances. Al-
though it might be possible to submit the question of malice to the 
jury simply on the basis of the conflicting allegations of the parties, 
that procedure would seem to provide the plaintiff little prospect of 
success in view of his heavy burden of proof.3°7 
303. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 880, 886 (D. Hawaii, 1981). 
304. Miller, 621 F.2d at 726. See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (lOth 
Cir. 1977). 
305. 259 F.2d at 550. See also Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 33 Conn. 
Supp. 204, 207, 370 A.2d 1095, 1098 (1976) (The information must be ''highly relevant to the 
proceeding."). · 
306. 492 F.2d at 636. The court in Carey also discussed why relevance was found in Garland 
but not in cases such as Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 
U.S. 966 (1973), where the information sought was relevant, but not central, to a federal class 
action alleging racial discrimination in the sale of houses. 492 F.2d at 636 n.9. 
307. 492 F.2d at 636-37. 
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Unlike the situation in Carey, in the careful review of claims, courts often 
do not require reporters to disclose, finding that the information sought 
would be of "only marginal relevance to the plaintifl's case."3°8 This re-
sult is proper, for the reporter should have to give up the confidential 
source or information only if the matter is truly of great importance to the 
resolution of the law suit. 309 
llnavai/ability. Most judges seem to apply strictly the rule that the 
party requesting the confidential data must show "that he has exhausted 
every reasonable alternative source of information."310 To be sure, many 
appeals courts require trial judges to make findings in the record with re-
spect to the unavailability of alternative sources. Some courts will reverse 
if the "findings contain only a general assertion of necessity. The con-
clusory statements fall far short of the type of specific findings of necessity 
which may overcome the privilege."311 
This exhaustion requirement is taken most seriously for fear that rou-
tine disclosure orders would, as a practical matter, eliminate the privi-
lege.312 In Zerilli v. Smith,3 13 for example, alternative sources for the 
information existed, but the plaintiffs argued that a review of these would 
be "time-consuming, costly, and unproductive." The court nevertheless 
required the plaintiffs to "[fulfill] their obligation to exhaust possible alter-
native sources of information."314 Similarly, the Second Circuit recently 
required the parties to conduct many more depositions before requesting 
the confidential source. ''This requirement is reasonable when balanced 
against the strain on the First Amendment. . . ."315 Of course, this princi-
ple could be carried to an extreme so that disclosure would never be or-
dered, thus making the privilege absolute. Most courts, however, are 
sensitive to the interests of both sides. In Carey v. Huine, the court re-
quired disclosure even though it was possible to track down the source, a 
UMW employee, by speaking with all employees. 
We think it may be assumed that the national offices of the 
308. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 718 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Taylor v. Miskovsky, 
640 P.2d 959 (Okla. 1981). 
309. See generally DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii 1981); Note, 
Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 338 (1981). 
310. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 96 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1982). See also Connecticut 
State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 33 Conn. Sup. 204, 207, 370 A.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1976). 
311. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 717 (3d Cir. 1979). 
312. See, e.g., United States v. Steelham.mer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976), where the reporter 
was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for refusing to disclose information. The reporter had 
attended a general meeting of a union (called to discuss a strike, in violation of a temporary 
restraining order). Many other persons were present at the meeting, yet the judge ordered the 
defendant to disclose the information regarding the meeting. The court on appeal reversed, find-
ing that if the reporter were forced to disclose information as to the meeting, it "would as a 
practical matter result in the closing of future meetings .... " I d. at 377. 
313. 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
314. Id. at 714. 
315. In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 
215 (1982). But see In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1980), where the court ordered disclosure 
even though many persons already known to the parties possessed the same information. The 
reporter's request for confidentiality amounts "'simply to a shuffie as to priority of time.'" I d. at 
470. . 
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UMWA are manned by a very substantial number of employees. It is 
also clear from the foregoing that the observations in question could 
have been made by anyone from an office boy to a top officer, and in 
any part of the building. We do not think that the concept of exhaus-
tion of remedies relevant here is invoked by guide marks as vague as 
these.3I6 
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Compelling need. This last prong of the three-part test is the most 
difficult to evaluate, for courts view it in different ways. Some judges sim-
ply look to the "need" factor as indicating no alternative sources.317 
Others seem to focus attention on a compelling need arising only if the 
litigants have first shown some likelihood of success in the lawsuit, thus 
indicating a nonfrivolous request.31S Most courts, however, look to this 
last element as an opportunity to balance, on an ad hoc basis, the interests 
served by the dissemination of the information as opposed to the mainte-
nance of the confidential relationship. As a judge in one recent case stated: 
"I do not find that the societal interest represented by the plaintiffs cause 
of action and served by compelling the reporter's testimony here ap-
proaches the societal interest in disclosure noted in Branzburg v. 
Hayes."319 
THE STATUTORY REsPONSE 
Until very recently there had been little legislative action in the area 
of the reporter's privilege for confidential sources and information. Mary-
land passed the first statute in 1896,32° but no other legislature acted until 
1933.321 Indeed, as of the date of the decision inBranzburg v. Hayes, only 
seventeen statutes had been enacted by the states.322 In recent years there 
has been a good dehl of discussion concerning the question of federal and 
state statutory reporter's privileges so that today a majority of states has 
some form of reporter's privilege.323 
316. 492 F.2d at 638. 
317. See, e.g., Maughan v. N.L. Indus., 524 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D.D.C. 1981); Application of 
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 582, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
318. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 880, 886 (D. Hawaii 1981). 
319. In re Forbes Magazine, 494 F. Supp. 780, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Liberty Lobby, 
Inc. v. Anderson, 96 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1982) (the question is ''whether this is the rare or 
exceptional case in which the disclosure of the source is critically necessary as going to the heart of 
the plaintifrs case, without which justice would fail"). 
320. The Maryland law ''was :passed in apparent response to the jailing, in early 1896, of a 
newspaper reporter who had obtamed information which enabled him to accurately report the 
proceedings of the Baltimore City Grand Jury." Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 717 n.2, 294 
A.2d 149, 152 n.2, ajf'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1973). 
321. New Jersey adopted its law in 1933. See generally Day, Shield Laws and the Separation of 
Powers .Doctrine, 2 CoM. AND THE LAW 1, Vol4 (1980). 
322. 408 U.S. at 689 n.27. 
323. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1973); ARiz. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1070 (West Supp. 
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8-901 to 8-909 
(Smith-Hurd Pamphlet 1983) (repealed 1982); IND. CODE§ 34-3-5-1 (1983 Supp.); KY. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 421.100 (Baldwin 1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-1451 to -1454 (West 1982); Mo. CTS. 
& Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1978); MINN. STAT. 
ANN.§§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 26-1-901 to 903 (1981); NEB. REv. 
STAT.§§ 20-144 to 146 (1977); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 49.275 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2A:84A-21 to 
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Branzburg no doubt spurred action by many legislators who were con-
cerned with the ambiguous holding in the case.324 Others were certainly 
reacting to the sharp increase in the number of judicial proceedings 
brought against members of the media.325 Still others may have been influ-
enced by the concern expressed by judges in fashioning a judicial remedy 
to this delicate weighing process.326 Whatever the reasons for the flurry of 
state activity, those reasons have not been sufficient to move the federal 
system into action for uniform legislation in the area.327 Unfortunately, 
while many bills were proposed in Congress both immediately after 
Branzburg and since, no statute has been adopted.328 Considering the na-
tional scope of much of the newsgathering and reporting processes, this 
lack of a national, uniform privilege is especially unfortunate.329 More-
over, this fact is troubling to lawyers and journalists because the state stat-
utes differ so very much in both scope and application.330 
A. The Variety of Alternatives 
The purpose of each of the state statutes is the same.331 The legisla-
21.13, -29 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983-84); N.M. STAT. ANN. 38-6-7 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. ClV. RIOHTS 
LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982-83); N.D. CENT. CoDE ANN. § 31-01-06.2 (1976); 
OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 2739.12 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 44.510-.540 (1981); 42 PA. CoN. STAT. ANN.§ 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 9-19.1-1 
to -3 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 24-1-208 (1980). 
324. See supra notes 62-110 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 42. 
326. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in Senear v. Daily Journal American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 
154, 641 P.2d 1180, 1185 (1982): 
If some kind of shield law for reporters is necessary under present day circumstances, as 
the majority recognized, it must be created. It seems to me that the legislature, consisting 
of some 147 members, is better able to determine the need for creating such a shield law 
than is this court. This is so not only because the legislature is closer to the people of the 
state than is the court, but also because the legislature is equipped to hold hearings to 
determine whether such a far-reaching change in the law is truly in the public interest. 
327. Surprisingly, many reporters do not appear to be aware of the statutory protection now 
offered in many states. See Blasi, supra note 2, at 275-76; Comment, Branzburg Revisited: The 
Continuing Search for a Testimonial Privi/e$e for Newsmen, 11 TULSA L.J. 258, 277 (1975). 
328. See Day, supra note 321, at 2; Ervm,In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEo. 
233,255-61 (1974); Note, Media Law, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 170, 188 (1981). Day points out that in 1973, 
the year followingBranzburg, over sixty bills creating a privilege were introduced in Congress. 2 
CoM. AND THE LAW at 1 n.3. 
329. The failure at the federal level is in sharp contrast to that found in an analogous area, 
governmental searches of media offices. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), the 
Supreme Court refused to recognize any First Amendment exception to otherwise proper searches 
conducted under the Fourth Amendment, even when the newspeople were not themselves sus-
pected of any wrongdoing. Just two years after the decision, Congress passed the Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1980, which sharply cut back on the Court's holding. Several states have also adopted 
provisions which limit Zurcher. See Higdon, The Burger Court and the Media: A Ten Year Per-
spective, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 593, 646 n.305 (1980). 
330. See Note, 54 TEMP. L.Q., supra note 326, at 188. But see O'Neil, Shield Laws: Partial 
Solution to a Pervasive Problem, 20 N.Y.L.F. 515 (1975). 
331. As indicated previously, no federal law on point has ever passed Congress. The Attorney 
General of the United States did, however, establish guidelines to be used by Justice Department 
attorneys. While the scope of these guidelines is obviously limited to actions in which the United 
States government is a party, the guidelines are useful in reflecting a government policy similar to 
judicial and state legislative pronouncements. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1982) provides, m material part: 
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of reporters to investi-
gate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of the government should not be used 
in such a way that it impairs a reporter's responsibility to cover as broadly as possible 
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tors declared that the gathering and dissemination of news was more im-
portant, at least in certain circumstances, than the disclosure of 
confidential sources and information. Some statutes contain specific refer-
ences to this policy.332 In other states the judges have so interpreted the 
intent of the legislature.333 While common patterns exist in the various 
state laws dealing with the reporter's privilege, there are important differ-
ences. In this section of the Article, I will discuss the important elements 
of the statutes and explain-by example-the manner in which the laws 
differ. 
Nature of the Privilege. The statutes can be characterized as either 
absolute or qualified. By enacting absolute laws, the legislators sought to 
create privileges which could not be lost irrespective of any competing in-
terests. In California, for instance, the statute declares that the reporter 
"cannot be adjudged in contempt . . . for refusing to disclose, in any pro-
ceeding . . . the sources of any information. . . ."334 No reference is 
made to the need for the information as asserted by investigatory bodies, 
criminal defendants, or civil plaintiffs. Similarly, the Indiana law indicates 
that the journalist "shall not be compelled to disclose in any legal proceed-
ings . . . the sources of any information procured or obtained. . . ."335 
The Illinois Code provides for a qualified privilege. It states that the 
reporter need not disclose the information unless "all other available 
sources of information have been exhausted and disclosure of the informa-
tion sought is essential to the protection of the public interest involved."336 
This requirement is very similar to the common law restriction imposed in 
/d. 
controversial public issues .... In balancing the concern that the Department of Justice 
has for the work of the news media and the Department's obligation to the fair adminis-
tration of justice, the following guidelines shall be adhered to by all members of the 
Department in all cases: 
(a) In determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to a member of the 
news media . . . the approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance between 
the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public's 
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice. 
(b) All reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information from alternative 
sources before considering issuing a subpoena. . . . 
(c) Negotiations with the media shall be pursued in all cases in which a subpoena 
to a member of the news media is contemplated. These negotiations should attempt to 
accommodate the interests of the trial or grand jury with the interests of the media. 
Where the nature of the investigation permits, the government should make clear what 
its needs are in a particular case as well as its willingness to respond to particular 
problems of the media. 
(e) No subpoena may be issued to any member of the news media ... without the 
express authorization of the Attorney General. 
332. The Minnesota statute explicitly declares that its purpose is to protect the free dissemina-
tion of information. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West Supp. 1983). 
333. See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 217-18, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 445 
(1975), cerl. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
334. CAL Evm. CoDE§ 1070(a) (West Supp. 1983). 
335. IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-3-5-1 (Bums Supp. 1983). 
336. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. llO, § 8-907(2) (1983). The New Jersey law is similar. See i'!fra 
note 353. 
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most federal courts.337 New Mexico also created a qualified privilege, but 
a somewhat more ambiguous version. Under the New Mexico law, the 
privilege was lost where "disclosure [is] essential to prevent injustice."338 
Coverage. Many of the more recently enacted statutes provide that all 
reporters and members of all forms of news media are covered under the 
privilege. Illinois defines a reporter as "any person regularly engaged in 
the business of collecting, writing, or editing news for publication through 
a news medium."339 "News medium" includes, among many others, "any 
newspaper or other periodical . . . a news service . . . a radio station; a 
television station. . . ."340 
The approach in other states is more limited. Alabama extends the 
privilege only to persons employed by newspapers and radio or television 
stations, thus excluding magazine reporters.341 New Jersey includes radio 
and television reporters, but only if the station keeps open for inspection 
exact recordings or transcripts of the news presentations in question. 342 
Publication. The early statutes tended to require publication of the 
info~ation before a privilege would be provided. The Alabama require-
ment is that the information be "published . . . broadcast . . . or tele-
vised."343 This requirement is somewhat difficult to understand. The 
information may be privileged because of the reporter's relationship with 
the source, a relationship which courts have determined should be pro-
tected. Why, then, should it matter whether the editor of the news decided 
to print or broadcast the reporter's story? Most statutes do not impose a 
publication requirement, so long as the information was received by the 
reporter during work-related activities.344 
Exemptions. Many statutes provide no exemptions at all. If the statu-
tory conditions are met, the source or information will be privileged. Cali-
fornia follows this rule and applies the privilege in "all proceedings of 
whatever kind in which testimony can be compelled by law to be 
given."345 In other states, however, some specific proceedings are excluded 
337. See supra notes 302-19 and accompanying text. 
338. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 38-6-7A, C (Supp. 1978). This statute was declared unconstitutional 
by the state supreme court in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 
(1976), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 359-61. 
339. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-902(a) (1983). 
340. Id. §(b). The approach under the California statute is similar, including persons em-
ployed by a newspaper, magazine, radio or television station. CAL. Ev10. Cool! § 1070 (West 
Supp. 1982). The California law is unique in one respect. It does not create a privilege, but 
simply states that the reporter is immune from punishment for refusing to disclose. In some cases 
(such as the civil action in which the reporter is a defendant) this distinction is of importance. See 
KSDO v. Superior Ct, 136 Cal App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982); Hammaily v. Superior 
Ct., 89 Cal App. 3d 388, 153 Cal Rptr. 608 (1979). 
341. ALA. Cooe § 12-21-142 (1975). 
342. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
343. ALA. Cool!§ 12-21-142 (1975). 
344. E.g., " ... any information procured or obtained in the course of his employment ...• " 
IND. Cool! ANN.§ 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1983). 
345. CAL. EVID. Cool!§ 901, Comment- Law Revision Commission (West 1966). The pro-
ceedings includes "civil and criminal actions and proceedings, administrative proceedings, legtsla-
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from the coverage of the statute. In lllinois, the legislators provided that 
the privilege rules are "not available in any libel or slander action in which 
a reporter or news medium is a party defendant."346 This restriction might 
be understandable in a jurisdiction which enacted an absolute privilege; 
the legislators would not want the reporter-defendant in a defamation ac-
tion to withhold relevant and vital discovery information from the ag-
grieved parties. In a qualified privilege jurisdiction-one which, by 
statute, uses a weighing proceess347-it is indefensible to obliterate any 
privilege simply because the reporter happens to be a defendant in a defa-
mation action. Cases may arise in which there is simply no need for dis-
closure. A far more defensible exclusion is present in New Jersey, where 
the privilege may not b~ claimed in "any situation in which a reporter is an 
eyewitness to, or participant in, any act involving physical violence or 
property damage."348 Here the legislative judgment is that in such cases 
the claimed privilege must bow to the public interest in the prevention of 
violence or property loss. This applies only in the limited situation in 
which the reporter actually witnessed the crime, a restriction generally im-
posed by the courts. 349 
Type of privileged matter. Many jurisdictions do not distinguish be-
tween the privileged source and the privileged information. The New 
York statute, to give one illustration, states that the journalist cannot be 
required to disclose "any news or the source of any such news. . . ."350 In 
some other states, however, the privilege extends only to the source.351 
Once again, it is somewhat difficult to understand this restriction. In many 
instances, of course, it is the source that the media wishes to protect. In 
some cases, though, the source may be known to the public, but the infor-
mation provided may be confidential. In still other cases, the source may 
not even be known to the reporter, but the information may be an impor-
tant part of the confidential news gathering process. 352 
Procedures. Many of the statutes make no specific provisions for pro-
cedures to be followed when the privilege is at issue. Other states are quite 
careful in establishing safeguards. In New Jersey, the statute sets forth in 
tive hearings, grand jury proceedings, coroners' inquests, arbitration proceedings, and any other 
kind of proceeding in which a person can be compelled by law to appear and to give evidence." 
I d. 
346. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 8-901 (1983). 
347. Illinois uses the usual weighing process elements: need, relevance, and unavailability. 
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 8-906 (1983). 
348. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-2la{h) (West Supp. 1983-84). 
349. See Sllpra notes 223-26 and accompanying text. 
350. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 79-h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-6-7A(l)(2) (Supp. 1978); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1982). 
351. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 12-21-142 (1975); IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1983). 
352. One issue which does not often arise under the statutes concerns the source of informa-
tion which was not derived from a confidential relationship. Most statutes simply make no refer-
ence to a requirement of a confidential relationship, referring only to sources or news information. 
Those few laws which do discuss confidential relationships make clear that such relationships are 
not prerequisites for the privilege. For example, the New York law creates a privilege even if ''the 
information was not solicited by the journalist or newscaster prior to disclosure to him." N.Y. 
CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 79-h(8)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). 
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detail the procedures to be followed. The reporter must make a prima 
facie showing, before trial, that she is covered by the privilege. At that 
point, the opposing party must show either by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the reporter waived the privilege or by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the qualified privilege requirements353 have been met. If the 
moving party prevails preliminarily, the judge must inspect the materials 
in camera.354 If a final trial court determination requires disclosure, an 
interlocutory appeal may be filed staying the imposition of a penalty.355 
B. The Constitutional Issues 
A number of important constitutional questions may be raised when 
courts apply a common law or statutory privilege for reporters. In a crimi-
nal prosecution, the defendant may claim that the extension of the privi-
lege denies the sixth amendment right to present evidence or confront 
witnesses.356 The civil plaintiff; who argues that she has been deprived of 
material important to the development of her case is less likely to suc-
ceed.357 These questions, however, arise in certain cases only because par-
ticular information is being kept from the litigants. Because most statutes 
would allow for the disclosure of information when needed,358 the issues 
are not especially crucial to the enactment of a statute. 
One issue, however, is directly linked to the statutory creation of a 
reporter's privilege. This issue concerns the separation of powers doctrine. 
It has been argued in several cases that legislatively created evidentiary 
privileges infringe on the role of the judiciary in determining the operation 
of courts. The leading case to adopt this position is Ammerman v. Hubbard 
Broadcasting, Inc .,359 where the New Mexico Supreme Court struck down 
the state's statutory privilege. The court found that the act of the legisla-
ture "did nothing more nor less than attempt to create a rule of evi-
dence."360 The statute was invalid because under the state constitution it 
is the power of the judiciary "to prescribe . . . rules of evidence."36t 
Ammerman, however, stands virtually alone. Few courts today seri-
ously entertain doubts about the constitutionality of statutes which create 
limited privileges for journalists. As explained by one commentator: 
"Privilege rules are not intended to regulate court procedure but rather to 
353. The balance in New Jersey is taken from the case approach. The moving party must 
show relevance, necessity, and unavailability from other sources and further demonstrate that the 
''value of the material sought ... outweighs the privilege against disclosure .•.. " N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 2A:84A-21.3(b) (West Supp. 1983-84). 
354. I d. § 21.4. 
355. I d. § 21.6. 
356. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text. 
357. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 NJ. 176, 190, 445 A.2d 376, 383-85 (1982), relying on 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), found that there was no violation of due process in such a 
restriction because the civil action of defamation was not entitled to any constitutional level of 
protection. 
358. This is so because most statutes create only qualified privileges, as opposed to the abso-
lute privileges. 
359. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976). 
360. 55 I P.2d at 1356. 
361. Id. at 1359. 
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promote state social policy. In creating a privilege, society, working 
through the state legislatures, has decided that protecting a given relation-
ship is more important than reaching the truth in a lawsuit."362 
C. The Open Questions 
Three important questions must be raised in connection with the state 
statutes which create journalist's privileges. The first concerns the impor-
tant issue of definition under the statutes, particularly the definition of 
those persons covered by the law. While some statutes give detailed state-
ments of the coverage,363 most statutes do not. The lawyer and reporter, 
thus, must attempt to understand, for instance, what it means to be a per-
son "connected with . . . news media for the purpose of gathering . . . 
news ... "364 With the usual investigative reporting, the problem is not 
serious. In today's reporting world, however, much of the reporting is not 
"usual." Consider, for instance, the parties involved in Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp .365 The plaintiff was the admipistrator of the estate of an 
employee of the defendant energy company who claimed that the defend-
ant and others violated the deceased's constitutional rights by conspiring to 
prevent her from organizing a union and by "willfully and wantonly con-
taminating her with toxic plutonium radiation."366 The Karen Silkwood 
story was very much in the public eye, and the "reporter'' had formed a 
production company for the purpose of making a film based on the life of 
Karen Silkwood. He was not regularly employed by a station or journal 
and was not under contract to any newsgathering company. Under many 
of the statutes, there would be grave doubt as to his receiving a privilege. 
The court properly held that a privilege would be applied, for he was regu-
larly engaged in the newsgathering process and was investigating the facts 
for purposes of dissemination to the public. 367 
The second open question relates to the application of the various 
statutes which utilize a qualified privilege. If all burdens of proof are met 
by the respective parties, under these laws the trial judge must then engage 
in a balancing process to determine if disclosure will be required. Unfor-
tunately, the application of the statutes will not be immediately predict-
362. Note, Separation of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 1059, 
1072 (1975). See also Note, A Study in Governmental Separation qf Powers: Judicial Response to 
State Shield Laws, 66 GEo. LJ. 1273 (1978); Day, Shield Laws and the Separation of Powers Doc-
trine, 2 CoM. AND THE LAW Vol. 4, 1, 8-9 (1980): 
I d. 
[T]he granting or withholding of an evidentiary privilege requires a balancing of 
competing policies. And the weighing of competing policy interests is a legislative, not a 
judicial, function. . . . States which have adopted modem evidence codes have recog-
nized that privilege rules should be made by the legislature. And most courts despite 
their reluctance to recognize a common law privilege for reporters, have acknowledged 
the substantive nature of such privilege rules. 
363. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-902(a) (1983), which defines reporter as "any per-
son regularly engaged in the business of collecting, writing, or editing news for publication 
through a news medium .... " 
364. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
365. 563 F.2d 433 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
366. I d. at 435. 
367. I d. at 437. 
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able, as they speak in terms of material being "essential to the protection of 
the public interest involved,"368 or "essential to prevent injustice."369 Pre-
sumably, under these statutes the judges will have to use the traditional 
federal common law approach,370 very much on a case-by-case basis,371 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that a major question here is the 
manner in which a national newsgathering process is to respond to the 
various state statutes.372 Some of the statutes grant absolute privileges; 
others give qualified privileges. Some laws require publication; others do 
not. Some distinguish between protection of sources and protection of in-
formation; other statutes make no such distinction. 373 How is a national 
magazine, television network, or newspaper to deal with such differences 
in state law? An answer, alas, is impossible to give. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen a great change in the judicial and legislative attitudes 
regarding a privilege for reporters to refuse to disclose confidential infor-
mation or sources. In spite of the paucity of early common law precedent 
and the ambiguous opinion of the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 
federal and state judges have looked both to constitutional law and to the 
developing common law to establish a qualified privilege in many cases. 
Moreover, since a majority of states have enacted statutory privileges, it 
can now be said safely that in most jurisdictions and in most cases a re-
porter will have at least a limited claim to a privilege. 
As I have pointed out, the establishment of such a qualified privilege 
is an important manifestation of the public's right to know under the First 
Amendment. Without such a privilege, the newsgathe~g and dissemina-
tion functions of the media would be seriously and adversely affected. In 
some cases, however, the claimed privilege of the media must fall before 
the need for information which is dispositive to the case and which cannot 
be obtained from other sources. Hence, the balancing test adopted by 
most courts makes sense under the first amendment right to know, the 
sixth amendment right of the criminal defendant to present her case, and 
the public's right to have fair and prompt adjudication of both civil and 
criminal cases. This balancing test, however, has been created largely on 
an ad hoc basis. Without a national statute or dispositive Supreme Court 
decision in this area, great problems remain in what is essentially a na-
tional newsgathering media. Until uniformity in this important sphere is 
368. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-907(2) (1983). 
369. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7-A, C (Supp. 1978). 
370. See supra notes 227-46 and accompanying text. 
371. In some states, additionally, questions can arise as to whether under the statute the re-
porter waived the privilege. See Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. NJ.M. Assoc., 180 N.J. Super. 459, 435 A.2d 
572 (1981), rev'd, 89 NJ. 212, 445 A.2d 395 (1982). 
372. There is also a question as to the response to the rules in the federal courts and in those 
numerous states where there is no statutory privilege. 
373. For a discussion of these points, see supra notes 320-55 and accompanying text. See also 
Comment, Newsmen's Privilege Two Years after Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment In 
Jeopardy, 49 TUL. L. REv. 417 (1975). 
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reached, the first amendment and rights of criminal defendants and civil 
plaintiffs will be unnecessarily subject to compromise. 
